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1. SUMMARY: This case is straightlined with Bell v. 
Dougherty Coupty School System, No. 80-1023. Both cases are 
~ to~ited States v. Seattle University, No. 80-493, a 
:..,..-----...; 
case on which cert has already been granted. 




of Education to issue regulation s prohibiting sex discrimination 
in the employment practices of institutions receiving federal 
financi~l assistanc~. §901 provides in pertinent part that "no 
person ..• shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity." HEW has 
interpreted §901 as prohibiting sex discrimination in the 
employment practices of educational institutions and has 
promulagated regulations to that effect. 34 CFR §106.51 and 
§106.54. 
The majority of ci courts, and virtually all of the 
District Courts, have held that the regulations are in exce s s of 
statutory authority. Seattle University, ~upra (CA9); Rome o ------Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (CA 6), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 972 (1979), Junior College District of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (CA 8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); 
Islesbor o School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (CA 1), 
cert. denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979). The courts reason that §901 
employees. 
------..,; 
The CA 5, in Bell v. Dougherty Cty Sch. Sys, has _ _. 
taken a middle ground. Its view is that §901 does not cover 
employees generally, but does apply to those employees in 
specific programs which receive federal funds. 
The CA 2 rejected the reasoning of those courts. It held 
that although the language of §901 is uncle a r, the legislative 
history of Title IX evinces Congressional intent that petr 
( regulate sex discrimination in employment. It relied 
particularly on a comment by Senator Bayh that: 
"the portion of the amendment covers 
discrimination in all areas where abuse has been 
mentioned -- employment practices for facul t y and 
administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, 
access to programs withiri the institution such as 
vocational education classes and so forth. 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972). 
3. CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION: Because of the conflict the 
case should be held for Seattle University. The caveat here is 
that respondent in Seattle University has filed a motion to 
withdraw, since in its view the case is now moot. The Department 
of Labor has apparently exonerated respondent of any 
discrimination in employment pratices. That motion has been 
distributed to the Conference and will be considered at the 
Feburary 20 Conference. 
In response to Seattle's motion to withdraw, the SG 
reiterates its letter dated January 6, 1981 to the Clerk, 
contending that the mootness question had been fully aired in the 
Court before the grant of cert. It asserts it will proceed with 
its briefing of the case. It suggests that this Court might want 
to appoint counsel as amicus curaie to file a brief in support of 
the judgment on review there. If the Court decides to vacate the 
grant, it should grant the petition either in this case or in 
Bell v. Dougherty County School System, No 80-1023. If this 
court decides that briefing an argument in Seattle University 
should go forward, then both this case and Dougherty should be 
held for Seattle University. 
/ 
- 4 -
I agree that if this Court decides to vacate the grant of 
cert in Seattle University, this case should be granted. 
Further, I recommend that Dougherty County be held. 
2/11/81 
JBP 
Knauss Op in petn. 
February 20, 1981 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell December 7, 1981 ~ 
~~~~ytl .,.u-/l'kL~ 
From: Mary A' ..... J. d...... _ ~ 
~ ~~; 
~~ ~~ ~.444-(_~ 
No. 80-986, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, et. al., & 
Trumbull Board of Education v. ~U~·=S~·~D~e~p~a=r~t=m~e~n~t~=-~~~~~~P~o~t~z 
~~  
-=~~==--------~~~ 
S C- cJ- 5..1!-<..-~ .z:Jl Question Presented 
~-1The questio presented is whether the Sec'y of Educ. 
exceeded his authority when he promul~ated regulations prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex in employment under §901 of Title 
IX, 20 u.s.c. §168l(a), which prohibits sex discrimination in 
federally funded educational programs and activities. 
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Unusual Posture of the Parties 
The Sec'y of Educ. now argues that the regulation are 
"ultra vires," and he has published notification of new rulemaking. 
The Court might feel that there is little point to reaching the 
merits. The SG, unfortunately, disagrees with the Sec'y, and has 
continued to litigate despite the Sec'y's . request that he reach some 
. . . ---....._______ 
understanding with the private parties and stop. Indeed, the SG now 
maintains that.the employment-discrimination regulations are 
\ 
mandated by the statute. He can, of course, no longer argue that 
they are within the scope of the Sec'y's discretion--the Sec'y has 
clearly stated that he will exercise his discretion by replacing 
them. See Brief of SG n.26 at 37; Reply Brief (yellow) of North 
Haven at 1-2. 
~~that the 
~ position v 
I may be unaware of how things work, but it seems to me 
Executive should come before this Court with one consistent 
in cases other than those involving independent regulatory 
agencies. And the SG's argument is somewhat irresponsible--by 
-:::==:=:::--
arguing that the regulations are mandated by the statute, he may be 
restricting future flexibility. The Executive would, one would 
think, necessarily prefer a broad range of options in implementing a 
statute. 
At first, I could not understand why the SG is wasting the 
Court's time. It is true that, under 20 u.s.c. §1682, the Sec'y 
cannot promulgate the new regulations without the approval of the 
President. But it seems unlikely the SG will really be able to stop 
the Sec'y from replacing the regulations with new ones that do not 
cover employment. 1 It may be, however, that the SG was unable to 
convince the individuals who filed charges to stop litigating, and 
one of them, Linda Potz, is a party to the Trumbull Board of 
Education suit, see note 14 infra. Until the regulations are 
3. 
actually rescinded, Potz has standing to enforce them regardless of 
the views of the SG. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 
677 {1979) {private right of action under Title IX). And, having 
petitioned for cert supporting her, the SG may feel some reluctance ~ 
to abandon them because of a pending change in administration 
policy. 
B. Title IX and the Regulations 
Congress passed Title I~ of the Educational Amendments of 
1972 to proscribe discrimination based on sex in educational 
institutions with regard to employment, pay, and program 
participation. Title IX included an amendment to Title VII, 42 
u.s.c. §2000e, et seq., removing the previous exemption for 
educational institutions with regard to employment discrimination. 2 
1The Dept. of Education is no longer enforcing the regulation. 
Under the previous Administration, when the CAs began invalidating 
the regulations {in order to avoid wasting resources), the Dept. of 
Educ.'s Office foi Civil Rights ·instructed its regional offices to 
proceed onlr when" {1) · .•• the prin~ipal purpose of the federal 
assistance 1n ~uestion is to provide employment or {2) ••. the 
allegedly discriminatory employment practice may have a 
discriminatory impact upon students or other direct beneficiaries of 
federal assistance:" Petn for Cert at 11 n.4 in Dept. of Educ. v. 
Seattle University, 101 S. Ct. 563 {1980). 
2The amendment making Title VII applicable to educational 
institutions was originally part of Title IX: it passed both houses 
and was included in the Conference Report. But it ~as not included j 
in the final codification enacted as Title IX because it had already 
Foo~note continued on next page. 
4. 
Title IX also amended the Equal Pay Act by adding 29 u.s.c. §213(a) 
_?"' 
making that Act applicable to professionals and white-collar 
workers. And §901 of Title IX, 20 u.s.c. §1681, the provision -- l quoted above, was enacted to bar discrimination in educational 
programs• and acti~tie~g fed~al funds. --------------- ~ Title IX (§901) was ~ed after 01) of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §2000d, which prohibits discimination 
excluding persons from federally financed programs or activities on 
the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin. The wording of 
the two statutes is virtually identical. 3 In fact, the original 
proposal for Title IX was to add "sex" to the list of 
discriminations prohibited by Title VI. But a separate provision 
was used so that Title VI would not have to be opened for 
' amendments, and a staffer with a xerox copy of Title VI cut and 
pasted it into Title IX. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives--Review of Regulations to implement Title IX, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. p.409 (1975). In the past, this Court has noted 
that "[t]he drafters of Title IX excplicitly assumed that it would 
been passed as part of the 1972 Civil Rights Act, P.L. No. 92-261. 
3Title VI (§601) states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." 
Title IX (§901) is quoted in text at the beginning of section II.A.l 
infra. 
5. 
be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been " ~nnon, 441 
U.S. at 696 n.l9. 
In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) promulgated regulations implementing Title IX. Subpart E of 
these regulations, entitled "Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in 
Employment in Education Programs and Activities Prohibited," 
addresses employment, employment criteria, recruitment, 
compensation, job classification and structure, fringe benefits, 
marital or parental status, advertising for personel, pre-employment 
inquires, and sex as a bona fide occupational qualification. See 
separate appendix to petn for cert at SA to 19A. Although some 
parts of the regulation refer to "programs or activities," for the 
"' , ... 
most part the regulation regulates the general employment practices 
of recipients." 
C. The Response in the Circuits, Including the Decision Below 
1. The other CAs. Four CAs, CAl, CA6, CAS, & CA9, have 
held that Title IX does not authorize regulations covering the 
employment practices of recipients. 4 The CAS held that the current 
regulations exceeded the scope of HEW's authority, but noted that 
HEW would have authority to promulgate regulations applicable to 
4see Seattle Universit~ v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 19SO), cert 
granted, 449 U.S. 1009 (19 0) (being held for this case: probably 
moot): Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d SSl (CA6), cert 
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979): Junior Colle~e v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 
424 (CAB), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (197 ): Islesboro School 
Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424 , cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 
(~ 979) . ' 
leA£) \ 
• 1..; 
employees paid with federal funds.s The CAS agreed with the other 
CAs that Title IX does not, for example, give HEW authority to 
promulgate general regulations concerning recipients' pregnancy 
policies. Dougherty, 622 F. 2d at 737 n.S. But the CAS thought 
6. 
that if, for example, a "female teacher whose salary is defrayed by 
federal funds and who is paid less than a male teacher in the same 
program," is subject to "discrimination under" a federally funded 
program and the recipient's conduct is therefore regulable under 
Title IX. !d., at 738. 
2. The decision below.A Charges of discrimination in 
employment were filed with HEW against petrs, the North Haven and 
Trumball Boards of Education. HEW investigated the charges and 
began administrative enforcement proceedings to determine whether 
funds should be terminated. The school boards brought separate 
suits in the D. Conn., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief 
against HEW's use of the Subpart E regulations. In separate actions 
before the same judge, summary judgment was granted for the School 
Boards. On appeal to the CA2, the cases were consolidated. 
On July 24, 1980, the CA2 (Kaufman, Oakes, & Tenney) 
reversed the DC and held that HEW had "authority under Title IX to - --. 
promulgate the employment discrimination regulations at issue here." 
Separate appendix to petn at 48A-2. The CA2 expressed no view about 
appropriate remedies. Id. 
In reaching its decision, the CA2 relied on the language 
SDougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 73S (CAS 
1980), cert pending No. 80-1023 (hold for this case). 
' . 
7. 
and policies of Title IX. And it placed great weight on ambiguous 
I'\.. '-'--
remarks made on the floor of the Senate by Senator Bayh, sponsor of 
the amendment to the Education Bill that included Title IX. The 
only written statement of the Senator used by the CA was one 
published a month after passage of the legislation. In addition, 
the CA relied on other statements made in debate and on the fact 
that Title IX, unlike Title VI, has no provision stating that the 
title did not apply to employment and on the fact that Congress had 
not amended the statute to limit its scope. 
I I. DISCUSSION 
A. The Statute 
1. Section 901. 
"No person ••• shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any eeducational program 
or activity~receiving financial assistance, except that 
.::=.•r §901, 20 u.s.c. §168l(a). 
A natural reading of these words limit the statute's scope to 
i/L \' 
discrimination against beneficiaries. It strains the language to 
maintain that teachers, administrators, secretaries, etc., who are 
discriminated against in employment are thereby excluded from 
participating in a program (students, not teachers, and certainly 
not administrators or secretaries, participate in programs) or 
denied its benefits (it is not designed to benefit those running it 
but those participating in it) or subjected to discrimination under 
the program (they may be discriminated against by the recipient's 
policies, but it is not discrimination under the program--an 
administrator may even be running the program) • 
;/~.£~ 
~~ 
The natural reading of the statute is reinforced by the 
list of nine excemption's from Title IX, all of which deal with 
~ -
participants in vprogra~sJnot recip~'s 
' ~......____~ 
-
employees. 6 And because 
this list is so thorough and carefully drawn, one suspects that if 
8. 
Congress had meant to include employment discrimination under Title 
IX, it would have included some definitions or exemptions-such as 
the exemption for bona fide seniority systems under Title VII. 
This is not to say that the language of the statute would 
never extend to any employment decisions. The statute does cover 
employment when the program or activity e~~loys participants, e.g., 
a work-study program would be an educational program and therefore 
under Title IX even though the program is one of employment. 
2. Section 902. Section 901 proscibes discrimination in 
an "educational program or activity." It is enforced by §902 which 
authorizes each federal department and agency extending financial 
assistance to educational programs to issue 
"rules, regulations, or ordeis of general aplicability 
which shall be· consistertt with achievement of the 
objectives of the statute ~uthorizing the financial 
assistance in connection with which the action is taken • 
• • • • Compliance with any require·ment adopted pursuant to 
' . 
6section 901 is followed by these nine exceptions: (1) 
statute's coverage limited- with regar issio 0 educational 
institutions; (2) gives dates for applicability of statute to 
admissions; (3) statute not applicable to religious institution if 
its application would be inconsistent with religious tenets; (4) 
exception for institutions training solders or merchant-marine 
personel; (5) exception for admissions to college or university that 
has always and only admitted one sex; (6) exception for certain 
sororities, fraternities, the girl and boy scouts, etc.; (7) 
exception fo certain national conferences for young people open only 
to one sex; (8) exception for mother-daughter father-son activities; 
and (9) scholarships awarded by institutions of higher education in 
"beauty" pagents. 
,.:.:':: 
this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or 
refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such 
program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has 
been an express finding •.• of a failure to comply with 
such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be 
limited ••• in its effect to the particular program, or 
part thereof, in which such noncom liance has been so 
oun , or any o er means aut or1ze y aw •••• ' 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the enforcement mechanism, like §901 itself, applies to 
"educational programs and activities" rather than institutions. 
9. 
Section 902 provides for the termination of funding once a 
violation has been found, but funding is only cut-off on a "program" 
basis. The employment regulations operate on a recipient bases, 
regulating, for example, a recipient's general pregnancy policy. 
The regulations are therefore inconsistent with §902's requirement 
that funding terminations be progrma-specific. Indeed, the SG has 
now conceded this point, and is forced to urge a narrowing 
construction to preserve the regulations. See SG's Brief at 43-46. 
He also argues that although "the regulations are not models of 
clarity on this point, they do not necessarily mandate such broad 
coverage." !d., at 46. This later argument requires, however, that 
one ignore the clear language of the regulations stating that 
recipients "shall" and "shall not" have certain employment practices 
and policies as a general matter without the slightest suggestion 
that the regulations apply only to employment decisions and policies 
made to staff federally funded programs and activities. 
B. Legislative Histroy 
1. Modelled after Title VI. As discussed in section I.B 
supra, Title IX is modelled after (actually, cut and pasted from) 
10. 
Title VI, which bans discimination on the basis of race in federally 
funded programs and activities. From the beginning, it was 
understood that Title VI did not apply to discrimination in the 
employment of those operating the federally assisted programs and 
activities. See 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 ( 196 4} (statement of Attorney 
General Kennedy} 7 ; Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the 
House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964} (statement 
of Congressman Celler, chairman of the House Rules Committee and 
House Floor Manager for Title VI}. 8 Section 604 was nevertheless 
added to Title VI to ensure that it would not construed as covering 
all employment in federally funded programs. 9 This amendment was 
not, however, seen as a change in the law. 10 
7The Attorney General explained: 
"Title VI is limited in application to instances of 
discrimination against beneficiaries of Federal assistance 
programs, as the language of §601 clearly indicates." 110 
Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964}. 
8The Congressman agreed that Title VI 
"applies only to the policy of the management of the 
school as far as students are concerned" and that 
discrimination against an applicant for employment in 
connection with a federally assisted program "has nothing 
to do with title 6. That .would come under FEPC [Fair 
Employment Practices Commission]." 
9section 604, 42 u.s.c. §2000d-3: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed 
to authorize action under this subchapter by any 
department or agency with respect to any emplyment practce 
or any employer, employment agency, or labor organiztion 
except where a primary objective of the Federal financial 
assistance is to provide employment." 
Footnote(s} 10 will appear on following pages. 
11. 
The SG attempts to negate the inference drawn from Title VI 
by noting that Title IX does not have any provision analogous to 
§604 of Title VI. See Brief of SG at 36 n.25. The initial version 
of Title IX did include a §904 equivalent to §604 of Title VI, but 
this was deleted because parts of Title IX--namely, the amendments 
to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act--were to apply to emplyment. And 
§904 was then quietly removed from the bill to remedy the "drafting 
error"--not to make a substantive change. 11 
Even the CA2 has construed Title VI as not covering 
employment except with respect to "federal funds aimed primarily at 
providing employment." Association Against Discrimination in 
. . \ \~ 
Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 25 FEP Cases 1013, 1028 (CA2 
1981}. And, as mentioned above in secion I.B supra, this Court has 
10 In the words of Senator Humphrey, the Senate Floor leader of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
"[W]e have expressed in specific legislative language what 
has always been intended." 110 Cong. Rec. 12707 (1964}. 
11see Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives--Review of Regulations to implement Title IX, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. p.409 (1975} (comments of Congressman O'Hara}: 
n 
"The staff was given overnight to draft this whole thing 
[Title IX] and they goofed, 904 got in there by mistake. 
"Now, great significance is being given to the fact 
that it was dropped out. It was dropped out because it 
got in through a drafting error. So the quiet, easy way 
to get it out was to slide it out somewhere along the line 
without having to go through a long explanation of how it 
got in." 
12. 
noted that "[t]he drafters of Title IX excplicitly assumed that it 
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been II Cannon, 
441 U.S. at 696 n.l9. Title VI is, therefore, strong evidence that -Title IX was not intended to regulate employment practices of 
recipients of federal funds. 
2. Senator Bayh and colleagues. The parties and the CA2 
below present an exhaustive analysis of every relevant word ever 
spoken in either House. See Brief of Petrs (blue) at 63-79; Brief 
of SG at 23-28; decision below in separate appendix to petn for cert 
at 33A-41A & 44A-45A. On balance, the debates suggest that Congress 
as a whole perceived Title IX as not including employment 
discrimination. Senator Bayh, sponsor of the amendment that became 
Title IX, and a few other supporters, such as Senator McGovern, see 
Brief of SG at 22-23, may have had a different understanding. All 
statements providing support for the regulations were made in debate 
(or in an explanation prepared after the passage of the Act, see 
separate appendix to petn at 41A) . 
Although a few statements of a handful of legislators 
support the regulations, deference to those statements--rather than 
the Congress' understanding that this act was modelled after Title 
VI which did not encompass employment discrimination--is 
inappropriate. Legislative history has been used by the Court for a 
relatively short period--only since the late Thirties or the 
Forties. Initially, there was no danger of legislative history 
created under false pretenses, i.e., because courts had not, in the 
past, referred back to legislative history, the sources initially 
13. 
consulted were the compilation of the legislative process in its 
natural condition. 
As courts have turned increasingly to legislative history, 
it is increasinly difficult to be sure of the integrity of these 
sources. Reports continue to be the best indication of what the 
drafters and those who passed the legislative are likely to have 
thought. No doubt parts of reports are now written with an eye to 
the courts, but reports are available to all prior to the vote and 
reliance on the reports as indicating the understanding of Congress 
is not entirely misplaced. Reports will usually describe accurately 
the compromise between competing interest groups achieved in the 
legislation--and the interest groups certainly have adequate 
incentive to ensure that the reports do truthfully report the deal 
struck. 
Remarks "on the floor" are another matter. There is no 
guaranty that any member of Congress heard statements appearing in 
the pages of Cong. Rec.~ one cannot tell by looking at Cong. Rec. /~ 
whether statements were actually made on the floor or whether they 
. -
were added to the record in written form after Congress adjouned fo 
the day. Even what looks like a colloquy between two members may 
have been added in written form without ever being spoken. And if 
the statements were actually made on the floor, it is likely that 
only a handful of members were present and that even fewer were 
paying attention. Courts engage in acts of pure fiction when they 
rely on such statements as indicative of anything other than one 
person's views--views he might be expressing only to influence 
courts on a point on which he lost in the legislative compromise and 
' . . 
14. 
could not, therefore, see included in a report. 
Courts do accord greater weight to reports than "debates," 
but it would save everone a lot of time and result in more accurate 
decisions if the Court were to hold that, as a general matter, 12 
debates should not be considered because they are unreliable: 
considering them, as I think the case at bar indicates, is likely to 
frustrate, not fulfill, the understanding and intent of the Congress 
that enacted the legislation in question. 
As Justice Jackson noted in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert 
Corp., 341 U.S. 384,, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., joined by Minton, 
J., concurring): 
"Resort to legislative history is only justified where 
the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I ~~~~~AA . 
think we should not qo beyond the Committee reports, whichd~~-­
presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. I 
cannot deny that I have sometimes offended against that n~ 
rule. But to select casual statements from floor debates, 
1 
A . 1 ~ not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a ~~
basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended 
to enact is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in 
one of its important functions •••• For us to undertake to 
reconstruct an enactment from legislative history is 
merely to involve the Court in political controversies 
which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but 
should have no place in is interpretation. 
The decision below illustrates the broad latitude courts have in 
deciding what a statute means if remarks "on the floor" can be used 
12There might be unusual circumstances in which courts can tell 
that a debate is actually reliable, but a per se rule might be best 
for two reasons. First, as soon as one opens this door at all, it 
is hard to keep courts from looking to see what is within--and once 
that happens, courts seem unable to restrain themselves from relying 
on legislative history regardless of reliability. Second, the legal 
community will save the time and money of searching through the 
Congressional Record only if the rule is per se. 
as their rationale. 
3. Failure to amend. The regulations were subject to a 
two-house veto: they were effective 45 days after promulgation 
15. 
unless overruled by a concurrent resolution. In the Senate, Senator 
Helms introduced a resolution disapproving the regulations in their 
entirety. See 121 Cong. Rec. 17300 (1975). No action was taken. 
In the House, the Subcommittee on Post-secondary Education 
held six days of hearings and various members of the Subcommittee 
introduced resolutions disapproving various portions of the 
regulations, including the education portion. 121 Cong. Rec. 21687 
(1975). No action was taken. 
The SG argues that this history supports the proposition 
that the regulations are consistent with the intent of the enacting 
Congress. It is not all that easy to get bills through Congress, 
however. And the Court should be reluctant to read inaction when 
one- or two-house vetos are possible as endorsement of agency 
action. If anything, even this much negative committee response 
suggests that the regulations might not have been precisely what the 
earlier Congress had in mind. 
C. Policy Considerations 
1. Overlapping jurisdiction. If the regulations are 
valid, then the Dept. of Educ. (and any other agency authorized to 
spend money for educational programs and activities) and EEOC both 
~ 
have jurisdiction over the employment practices of educational 
organizations receiving federal funds. It would be one thing if 
16. 
overlapping jurisdicton only meant an additional remedy in the event 
of the same unlawful act. The regulations define employment 
practices that may result in the termination of funds, however, and 
there is no guarantee that these regulations will be consistent with 
EEOC's. 
Moreover, in maintaining that the regulations are mandated 
by the statute (not subject to agency discretion, see discussion in 
section I.A supra), the SG argues that the Sec'y of Educ. has but 
little expertise in this area: "The Department of Education has 
only limited expertise in employment matters." Brief of SG n.26 at 
~ 
37. It would be interesting ~ ask the SG why he thinks Congress 
delegated j~o~over e~ployment, duplicating the jurisdiction~ 
of the EEOC, to an inept administrator. If the Sec'y of Educ. is 
has little expertise with regard to employment (the regulations have 
been on the books since 1975), then the Sec'y of Educ. may not have 
been qualified to ivestigate the employment practices of the North 
Haven13 and Trumbull School Boards. 14 
13The North Haven Board refused to rehire a tenured teacher who 
had taken a one-year maternity leave. In the subsequent 
investigation, HEW asked North Haven to provide specific information 
concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and 
tenure. At this point, North Haven sought an injunction in DC. 
14A former guidance counselor in the Trumbull public schools, 
Linda Potz, filed a charge that the Trumbull Board gave her inferior 
job assignments, inferior working conditions, and refused to renew 
her contract because of her sex. HEW determined that Trumbull had 
indeed violated Title IX by requiring Potz to type and run errands 
not required of male counselors, by moving her office to a smaller, 
poorly heated, and less comfortable space in the gym away from the 
other counselors, by asking her to change a report showing that she 
had seen many more students in a given week that the number seen by 
her male counterparts, and by not renewing her contract, all on the 
basis of sex. 
17. 
2. Should participants be denied programs when there is 
employment discrimination? Another reason to hesitate before 
reading Title IX as covering employment discrimination is the effect 
such an extension would have. It is one thing to say, as Congress 
clearly did, that if a federally funded educational program 
discriminates among participants on the basis of sex, the federal 
government will not continue to fund it--in other words, if the 
recipient denies the benefit to an otherwise qualified applicant on 
the basis of sex, then all beneficiaries will receive that 
treatment. It is another to presume that Congress also meant to 
authorize the termination of funds benefiting program participants 
because the recipient disciminated against an employee. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The question presented is whether Title IX, which bans 
discrimination in federally funded educational activities and 
programs, covers discrimination in employment by recipients. The 
current regulations apply generally to a recipient's employment 
practices and are not limited by program (as required for fund 
terminations under §902) or to discimination against participants in 
educational programs, such as work study, involving employment. Nor 
are the regulations limited to so-called "infectious" 
discrimination--discrimination in employment affecting the 
atmosphere of the program for participants. 
The statute's language and legislative history indicate 
that the regulations are not authorized by §901. The contrary 
evidence consists of statements in Cong. Rec. (which might or might 
18. 
not have been made on the floor), an explanation published after the 
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80-986 North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 
/ 
MEMORANDUM TO FILE: This is a brief memo dictated merely to 
refresh my memory as to the issues in these two consolidated 
cases, presenting the same question. I will want to take a 
closer look at the briefs, certainly before going to 
Conference. 
Petitioners are two Connecticut school districts that 
receive federal financial assistance, and therefore are 
subject to the provisions of Title IX. The pertinent 
provisions of Title IX are: 
Section 901 provides that "no person ••. 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denTed the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance." 
Section 902 provides, in substance, that each 
federal department or agency empowered to 
grant federal assistance is authorized to 





To implement Section 901, HEW issued regulations 
It ,~ 
prohibiting sex discrimination in the employment practices 
·. 
of federally assisted education programs (1977) . 
After complaints were filed of discrimination in 
employment - by a tenured teacher who had taken a one year 
maternity leave and a former employee who had been given 
"inferior job assignments" and who was fired. 
HEW notified petitioners that it had received 
complaints, and requested "information concerning their 
• 
policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and 
tenue." The school districts instituted these consolidated 
suits, seeking a declaratory judgment that Title IX confers 
no authority on HEW to regulate employment practices. The 
DC agreed with respondents and invalidated the employment 
practice regulations. CA 2, however, reversed. 
Petitioner's Argument 
Their brief asserts there have been 17 decisions 
declaring subpart E of the Reg (herein referred to as the 
Reg) illegal, with only CA 2 holding otherwise. If the '' H:u!. 
~ 
cases are correctly cited (Pl3) , at least a half a dozen of ~·~ 
m these decisions are CA's. 
statutory construction, and - ~
each ~~?port to rely on the plain~ ~-
The case is one of 
typically - the parties 
. ' 
3. 
langauge, legislative history, and the structure of the 
various regulatory statutes. 
Other pertinent statutes, in addition to Title IX, are 
Title VII (the basic anti-discrimination law), Title VI, The 
Equal Pay Act (equal pay for women), and Title XIX. 
Petitioners' principal arguments are that Sections 901 
and 902 are directed at beneficiaries (~~~~  ~ 
colleges) of federally financed education programs, and not 
at their employees: ~ that 902 speaks in terms of 
"particular programs or parts thereof that receive federal 
aid", and that therefore the regulation~ with respect to all 
employees of a school or college are not authorized. 
The key language of Section 901 parallels directly, as 
the Court noted in Cannon, Section 601 of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The legislative history of Title 
VI makes clear that Section 601 thereof was not intended to 
cover employment discrimination. 
Respondents also argue that the federal government and 
individual employees have ~her mean~ to remedy employment 
discrimination by educational institutions, notably Title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act, functioning particularly through 
EEOC and the Secretary of Labor. 
I .. 
' ' 
The Solicitor Generals's Brief 
Apart from construing the language of Section 901 and 
902 differently from petitoners, the SG relies heavily on 
his reading of the legislative history. 
4. 
He notes the similarity between Sections 901 and 902 of 
Title IX to Title VI, but emphasizes that Title VI includes 
-
a provision (Section 604 thereof) that expressly excludes 
from its coverage "employment practices", subject to certain 
exceptions. The SG points out that similar language was 
proposed and rejected with respect to Tile IX, quoting 
statements made on the Floor by Senator Byah. 
The parties differ as to the signifinance of the 
rejection of a provision similar to Section 604. See 
petitioner's brief. Petitioners counter with the argument 
J. 
that the Justice Department propose language for Title IX 
A 
that would have expressly included employment discrimination 
in the coverage of Section 901, a proposal that was 
rejected. 
*** 
Some very tentative thoughts: It seems to me that the 
language itself rather strongly favors the petitioners. At 
best, it is ambiguous, and in view of other specific 
legislation authorizing employment regulation one normally 
would not construe ambiguous langauge as adding a further 
layer of federal oversight. 
5. 
With EEOC and the Labor Department both having 
extensive authority over discrimination in employment, there 
appears to be no need to add a third regulatory agency. I 
would be reluctant to construe Sections 901 and 902 to this 
effect unless my clerk can persuade me rather clearly that 
this was congressional intent. 
Finally, the decison of CA 2 stands alone against an 
impressive array of other federal court decisions. I would 
like to read one of the best of these decisions. 
' , 
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To implement Section 901, HEW issued regulations 
prohibiting seX' discrimination i.n the employment practices 
of federally assisted education programs (1977) • 
After complaints were filed of discrimination in 
employment - by a tenured teacher who had taken a one year . . 
maternity leave and a former employee who had been given 
"inferior job assignments" and who was fired. 
HEW notified petitioners that it had received 
2. 
, complaints, and requested "information concerning their 
policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and 
tenue." The school districts instituted these consolidated 
suits, seekinq a declaratory iudgment that Title IX confers 
no authority on HEW to regulate employment practices. 'r'he 
DC agreed with respondents and i.nvalidated the employment 
practice regulations. CA 2, however, reversed. 
Petitioner's Argument 
Their brief asserts there have been 17 decisions 
declaring subpart E of the Reg (herein referred to as the 
Reg) illegal, with only CA 2 holding otherwise. If the 
cases are correctly cited (Pl3), at least a half a dozen of 
these decisions are CA's. 
The case is one of statutory constructi.on, and -
typically - the parties each proport to rely on the plain 
. '· 
'· 
langauge, legislative history, and the structure of the 
various regulatory statutes. 
3. 
Other pertinent statutes, in addition to Title tX, are 
Title VII (the basic anti-discrimination law), Title VI, The 
Equal Pay Act (equal pay for women), and Title XIX. 
Petitioners' pri.ncipal arguments are that Sections 901 
and 902 are directed at beneficiaries (e.g. the schools or 
colleges) of federally financed education programs, and not 
at their employees1 and that 902 Rpeaks in terms of 
"particular programs or parts thereof that receive federal 
aid", and that therefore the regulation with respect to all 
employees of a school or college are not authorized. 
The key language of Section qol parallels directly, as 
the Court noted in Cannon, Section 601 of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The legislative history of Title 
VI makes clear. that Section 601 thereof was not intended to 
cover employment discrimination. 
Respondents also argue that the federal government and 
individual employees have other means to remedy employment 
discrimination by educational institutions, notably Title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act, functioning particularly through 
EEOC and the Secretary of Labor. 
,. 
The Solicitor Genet:als's 'Brief 
Apart from construing the language of Section 901 and 
902 differently from oetitoners, the SG re1.ies heavjly on 
his reading of the legislative history. 
4. 
He notes the similarity between Sections 901 and 902 of 
Title IX to 't'itle VI, but emphasizec; that Title VI includes 
a provision (Section 604 thereof) that expressly excludes 
from its coverage "employment practices", subject to certain 
except ions. 't'he SG poi.nts out that s :f.ml lar J anguage was 
proposed and rejected with respect to Tile IX, quoting 
statements ma~e on the Floor by Senator. Byah. 
The parties differ as to the signifinance of the 
rejection of a provision similar to Section 604. See 
petitioner's brief. Petitioners counter with the argument 
that the Justic~ Department prooose language for Title IX 
that would have expressly included employment dlscrimi.nation 
in the coverage of Section 901, a proposal that was 
rejected. 
*** 
Some very tentative thoughts: It seems to me that the 
language itself rather strongly favors the petitioners. At 
best, it is ambiguous, and in view of other specific 
legislati.on authorizing employment regulation one normally 
would not construe ambiguous langauqe as adding a further 
layer of federal oversight. 




Wlth EEOC and the Labor Department both having 
extensive authority over discrimination in employment, there 
appears to be no need to add a third regulatory agency. I 
would he reluctant to construe Sections 901 and 902 to this 
effect unless my clerk can persuade me rather clearly that 
this was congressional intent. 
Finally, the decison of CA 2 stands alone against an 
impressive array of other federal court decisions. I would 
like to read one of the best of these decisions. 
.. 
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Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 1980), cert granted, 
449 U.S. 1009 (1980) (being held for this case; probably moot) 
(CA9's description of rationale of other CA's, which it adopts). 
The first of these CAs to reach the issue was the CAl in 
Islesboro School v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424 (CAl) (Coffin, Campbell, 
& Bownes), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979) (book attached) (good 
opinion). The court began with the langue of the statute: 
"on its face, [the statute] is aimed at the beneficiaries 
of the federal monies, i.e., either students attending 
institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged 
in special research being funded by the government. The 
s~i~_Q9t_~lud_e_~pjyee§ . within j._t~ terms. This 
reading of the ~lain~~~Ege is buttressed by an 
examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the 
statute. They all deal with student admissions or 
activities of a student nature, ..•. Nothing in the 
statute suggests that it should be construed to exten~to 
employees ~ employees (as opposed to their status as 
recipients of specialized federal f~nding for a special 
activity or research)." Id., at 426. 
The next CA to consider the issue was the CA8 in Junior 
College v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119 (CA8), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 
(1979). The First Circuit's decision in Islesboro is quite good, 
and the CA8 simply adopted it. After doing so, it remarked that 
"[t]he First Circuit accurately noted that the plain language 
does not include employment discrimination." Id., at 121. 
---------------------------
The third CA was the CA6, in Romeo Community Schools v. 
HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). With 
regard to HEW's construction of Title IX, the court stated: 
"We find HEW's construction of Title IX to be 
strained. It seeks a reading of ... 'no person shall be 
discriminated against, on the basis of sex, in the 
operation of any educational institution receiving federal 
financial assistance.' However, as actually written, the 
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2. 
I. THE STATUTES 
1. Title VI (Section 601). 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 
42 u.s.c. §2000d. 
2. Title VII (Section §703 (a)). 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, religion, sex, or 
national origin." 
3. Title IX (section 901). 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any educational program or 
activity receiving financial assistance, except that .••• " §901, 
20 u.s.c. §168l(a). 
4. The Equal Pay Act (29 u.s.c. §206(d). 
"Prohibition of sex discrimination. 
(1) No employer having employees subject to any 
provisiQnS-of~his section shall discriminate, within any 
establishment in which such emp oyees are employed, between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees 
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which 
he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such 
establishment for the equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requres equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions, except 
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority 
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a 
differential based on any other factor other than sex: 
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate 
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in 
order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, 
reduce the wage rate of any employee." 
3. 
5. As drafted and as it initially passed both houses, Title IX 
would have amended both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Title VII 
banned discrimination on the basis of sex from the very beginning, 
but §70l(b) defined employer as not including a state or political 
subdivision with respect to its employees in educational 
institutions. There was also an exemption from T~tle VII coverage 
for all persons employed in all educational institutions. 
The Equal Pay Act also banned discrimination on the basis 
of sex, but it did not apply to executive, administrative, or 
professional employment. 
As originally drafted, Title IX of the Higher Education 
Act of 1971 included sections amending both Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act, making both applicable to professionals employed at 
educational institutions. The amendments to Title VII were also 
included in the Civil Rights Act of 1972, which was enacted first. 
The amendments to Title VII were in the Higher-Education-Act bills 
all the way through Conference, and were dropped from the final 
codification only because the Civil Rights 'Act of 1972 was already 
law. 
II. HAVE COURTS CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR 
THE REGULATIONS? 
v ~ • ~ 
1. Four CAs (CAl, CA6, CA8, & CA9) think that the statutory 
language does not support the regulations. Four CAs have rejected 
the Sec'y's regulations because ~ "neither the 
Title IX nor the legislative history support HEW's 
~0 
Congress intended that statute reach employment discrimination." 
1\ 
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 19SO), cert granted, 
449 u.s. 1009 (19SO) (being held for this case; probably moot) 
(CA9's description of rationale of other CA's, which it adopts). 
The first of these CAs to reach the issue was the CAl in 
4 0 
Islesboro School v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424 (CAl) (Coffin, Campbell, 
& Bownes), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979) (book attached) (good 
opinion). The court began with the langue of the statute: 
"on its face, [the statute] is aimed at the beneficiaries 
of the federal monies, i.e., either students attending 
institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged 
in special research being funded by the government. The 
sect'on does not include ern yees within its terms. This 
reading of the pla1n language 1s uttressed y an 
examination of the specifi c exemptions mentioned in the 
statute. They all deal with student admissions or 
activities of a student nature, ••.• Nothing in the 
statute suggests that it should be construed to exten~ to 
employees ~ employees (as opposed to their status as 
recipients of specialized federal funding for a special 
activity or research)." Id., at 426. 
The next CA to consider the issue was the CAS in Junior 
College v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119 (CAS), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 
(1979). The First Circuit's decision in Islesboro is quite good, 
and the CAS simply adopted it. After doing so, it remarked that 
"[t]he First Circuit accurately noted that the plain language 
does not include employment discrimination." Id., at 121. 
-----------------------------------~-
The third CA was the CA6, in Romeo Community Schools v. 
HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). With 
regard to HEW's construction of Title IX, the court stated: 
"We find HEW's construction of Title IX to be 
strained. It seeks a reading of •.• 'no person shall be 
discriminated against, on the basis of sex, in the 
operation of any educational institution receiving federal 
financial assistance.' However, as actually written, the 
statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are 
modified by later language which clearly limits their 
meaning, The concern of this particular statute is not 
with all discrimination against persons in any way 
connected with educational institutions which receive 
federal funding. Rather, it reaches only those types of 
disparate treatment which manifest themselves in exclusion 
from, denial of benefits of, or otherwise result in 
discrimination on the basis of sex 'under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistnce 
' Unless the discrimination relates to a program or 
activity which receives federal funding, it is not 
prohibited by §1681." 
5. 
The fourth CA, the CA9, in University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 
(CA9 1980), cert granted, 449 u.s. 1009 (1980) (being held for this 
case; probably moot) simply reported and adoped the rationales of 
the other CAs after noting that the others had concluded that 
"neither the plain language of Title IX nor the legislative history 
support HEW's contention that Congress intended that statute reach 
employment discrimination." (As quoted in opening paragraph). 
2. CAS expressed no view on question. The only other CA 
7 
to have considered the case is the CAS, in Dougherty County School 
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 73S (CAS 1980), cert pending No. 80-1023 
(hold for this case). The CAS held that the current regulations 
exceed the Sec'y's authority, but noted that the Sec'y would have 
authority to promulgate regulations applicable to employees employed 
in particular programs receiving federal funds. The CA did not 
directly address the clarity of the statutory language, though it 
did base its construction on the fact that a teacher discriminated 
in employment could be regarded as "subjected to discrimination 
under" a program receiving federal financial assistance. Id., at 
738. 
The CAS did stress that it was "according great lattitute 
to the Secretary." Id., at 737. And the CAS also stressed that the 
6. 
courts should accord deference to the Sec'y's interpretation. This 
emphasis suggests that the CAS did not read the statute as 
unambiguous support for the regulations. If the clear language of 
the statute supported the regulations, reliance on broad agency 
discretion and notions of deference would not have been necessary. 
The SG, at oral argument, said that he agreed with the CAS 
decision and thought it was a good opinion. Not only did the CAS 
overrule the current regulations because they are not program-
specific, the CAS by no means indicated that even the more limited 
regulations it would consider valid (applying to employment of 
teachers in federally funded programs) would be valid because 
mandated by the statute. Indeed, a reading of the CAS's decision 
suggests that those regulations would most likely be sustained by 
the CAS only as a valid exercise of authority on the part of the 
Sec'y. The SG has conceded in n.26 at 37 that, were the Sec'y to 
exercise any discretion, he would rescind the regulations. This 
Court cannot, therefore, sustain the regulations on the basis the 
CAS would presumably use in upholding the more limited regulations 
it indicated it would consider valid. 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: Was SG fair? 
1. Title VI. I think the SG's treatment of this point was 
very unfair. He made two main points. (i) The inclusion of §604 
(Title VI does not apply to employment) creates a strong presumption 
that Title IX must since it does not include a similar §904. (ii) 
The House version contained a §904 and it "receded" at Conference 
7. 
indicates that the House lost on the substantive question of whether 
Title IX applied to employment. 
The SG agrees that §604 was meant to state the obvious. 
Its absence from Title IX should not, therefore, matter. I think he 
is wrong in stating that the inclusion of a clarification in one 
section means that that section is substantively different from 
another equivalent section lacking the clarifying language. His 
rigid rule does not recognize the sloppy way in which legislation is 
drafted--as the cut-and-paste job in the case at bar illustrates. 
As I mentioned when we talked, the fact that the House 
"receded" hardly means the House recognized that it had lost on a 
substantive point. It simply means that the House agreed not to 
fight to retain §904. That concession should not mean much given 
that §604 was never regarded as necessary and §904, as then drafted, 
clearly had to come out of the bill since it was inconsistent with 
the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act which were within 
Title IX at the time of the Conference, see discussion in section 
I.~ supra. Given that the provision was apparently regarded as 
unnecessary {§604 was seen as unnecessary) , the easiest solution 
would have been to simply drop it rather than re-draft it so as to 
apply to only parts of Title IX. All this is clear from looking at 
the bill before the Conference and the history of §604, even without 
relying on the corroborative testimony given by Congressman O'Hara 
at the later hearing. 
2. The debates. The SG was no fairer here. He began by 
~ 
noting that two parts of Title IX being discussed: {i) the 
~ 
amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act {EPA) and {ii) Title 
8. 
IX ~lf (§901). He then stated that any portion of the legislative 
history--i.e., any specific reference to employment--might apply to 
(i) only or (ii) only or both. He then presented his two 
propositions: (a) no where was there any suggestion that Title IX 
only applied to emp~ment through the amendments to the EPA and 
Title VII; and (b) there are three Bayh statements that are only 
consistent with coverage of employment by Title IX. ~~~ 
(a). No evidence em 1 ent onl covered b ~A and Title 
VII amendments. This is certainly not true. Senator Bayh himself 
stated: 
"I might point out that, so far as involvement or 
supervision by the Secretary of HEW is concerned, we 
really are not doing anything to the private school that 
is not now in the law under title VI of the 1964 civil 
rights Act, relating to discrimination in other areas. 
"We are saying that the power which now resides in the 
Federal Government over private institutions shall be 
extended. We are only adding the 3-letter word 'sex' to 
existing law." 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971) (Senator 
Bayh). 
In addition, there are many descriptions of the legislation 
which tacitly assume that employment is covered by the EPA and Title 
VII amendments rather than §901. It is true that these descriptions 
do not come out and state "and employment is covered only under 
§901, but such a broad statement would not really be true. All 
concede that §901 would cover employment when §601 would cover 
employment--e.g., in a work-study program or a program of grants for 
research. In the general descriptions of the legislation, even that 
given by Senator Bayh in the prepared portion of his remarks, the 
implicit understanding is that direct coverage of employment is 
under Title VII and EPA not Title IX: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally 
assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the proh~tion does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my 
amendment sets forth prohibition and enfocement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI. 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added) (Bayh). 
9. 
Thus, in presenting the summary of §901 of Title IX, Bayh indicated 
that his amendment was equivalent to Title VI and would end 
discrimination against "the beneficiaries of federally assisted 
programs and activities." Senator Bayh then, in a separate part of 
this statement, discussed the changes in Title VII and the EPA under 
the heading "B. Prohibition of Education-Related Employment 
Praqctices." Id., at 5808. The relevant section of the House 
Report contains a similar breakdown. H. R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 51-51 (1971). As the CAl noted in discussing Bayh's 
summary, of the bill: 
"This breakdown demonstrates that the basic provisions 
dealing with admissions and services at educational 
institutions, now embodied in Title IX, were weparate and 
distict from the provisions amendding Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act, both of which dealt with employment." Id., 
at 428. -
(2) Three statements demand that Title IX cover 
employment? There are three portions of Bayh's remarks which, if 
the words are parsed like a statute, indicate that §901 applies to 
employment. One of them--the prepared one!--is clearly confused. 
It uses the wrong section numbers in referring to the act and in one 
sentence indicates that §901 will apply to employment and in the 
next states that the provision has "been tested under title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the last 8 years so that we have 
evidence of [its] effectiveness and flexibility." 118 Cong. Rec. 
10. 
5807 (1972) • Bayh did not have a good grasp of the details of the 
statute. 
Looking at the debates as a whole, I agree with the CAl. 
The remarks on which the SG would place ~e such reliance 
"were the product of the imprecision of oral discussion 
rather than a reflection that the Act intended section 901 
of Title IX to embrace prohibitions against sex 
discrimination in employment. This was reserved for the 
amended Title VII and Equal Pay Act." 593 F. 2d at 428. 
Given that Bayh himself told the Congress his amendment would only 
extend the coverage of Title VI and did so in clear and unambiguous 
words, the fact that other portions of his statements in the rather 
confused debate suggest otherwise is far too little in the way of 
legislative history to overcome the language of the statute and the 
explicit adoption of Title VI's words, which were not regarded as 
extending to employment. 
,; 
INFORMATION REQUESTED 
1. Description of hiring process 
a. Persons involved in decision-making (by position); who 
makes what decisions? 
b. Copy or established procedures; if not in writing, explain 
how the process is communicated to the decision-makers 
and to persons affected by it. 
2. Description of criteria applied in hiring process 
a. Nature, purpose and relative w~ight of each criterion. 
b. A copy of written criteria; if not in writing, how are 
criteria communicated to decision-makers and persons affected. 
3. Copy of employment application form for teaching positions. 
4. Copy of collective bargain contract{s) covering teachers for 
period from January, 1976 to present. 
5. Copy of all policies relating to granting of leaves of absence. 
6. Copy of all policies relating to seniority and tenure. 
tuor~ H-a~ ~ ,fol&. 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-986, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, et. al., 
& Trumbull Board of Education v. u.s. Department 
of Education & Potz 
IV. WHAT MATERIALS DID HEW REQUEST FROM THE SCHOOL BOARDS? 
1. North Haven. The North Haven Board refused to rehire a 
tenured teacher who had taken a one-year maternity leave. In the 
subsequent investigation, HEW asked North Haven to provide specific 
information concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, 
seniority, and tenure. A xerox of the request is attached. Rather 
than respond, North Haven sought an injunction in DC. 
2. Trumbull. A former guidance counselor in the Trumbull 
public schools, Linda Potz, filed a charge that the Trumbull Board 
gave her inferior job assignments, inferior working conditions, and 
refused to renew her contract because of her sex. HEW determined 
that Trumbull had indeed violated Title IX by requiring Potz to type 
and run errands not required of male counselors, by moving her 
office to a smaller, poorly heated, and less comfortable space in 
the gym away from the other counselors, by asking her to change a 
report showing that she had seen many more students in a given week 
2. 
that the number seen by her male counterparts, and by not renewing 
her contract, all on the basis of sex. 
The record received by the Clerk's Office does not include 
the DC proceedings for Trumbull. The briefs give only no 
description of the HEW investigation, only reporting that Trumbull 
cooperated up to the point at which it received a letter from HEW 
demanding Trunbull's agreement to HEW's remedial plan (which 
included reinstating Potz) under threat of a fund cutoff. At this 
point Trumbull sought declaratory relief. Without the record from 
the DC, further details are unavailable. 
V. THE EEOC REGULATIONS AND THE SEC'Y's 
There do not seem to be any significant differences between 
the regulations. Although the Sec•y requires that all pregnant 
teachers be given unpaid leaves and the EEOC regulation does not, 
the EEOC regulation provides that an an employer must give such 
leaves (for disability) unless the policy does not have a disparate 
impact on one sex and is justified by business necessity. This 
makes little sense given that only one sex can be subject ot the 
disability, but, in any event, it seems unlike that such a policy 
would be regarded by the EEOC as justified by business necessity in 
the context of operating a school. 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Chief, 
~u.prttttt <!fcnrl cf firr~h ~hm,G 
'Jlfrur~ gl. <!J. 2.0~J!..;l 
December 11, 1981 
RE: No. 80-986 North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell 
Harry has agreed to undertake the opinion for 
the Court in this case . 
The Chief Justice 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u.prnttt <lfouri ltf tqt ~b ~tatts 
'Jfufri:ttghtn. ~. <!f. Zll.;t~~ 
j 
February 11, 1982 
RE: No. 80-986 North Haven BOard of Education 
v. Bell 
Dear Lewis: 





.· ···J .. ~ 
February 16 , 1982 
~ 
P0-98~ North Have~ Boatrl of Education v. Bell 
De~r Chief: 
I will he glad to try a dissent, although it will 
h~ somP. time h~fore I get to it . 
Sincerely , 




JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§lqlrtmt <!):ami: of tltt ~itth .§fzrltg 
:.&glfinghm. ~. <!):. 20~~~ 
March 16, 1982 
/ 
Re: 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education 
v. Bell 
Dear Harry: 











JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
;%u:.prtntt <!Jou.rt of tlrt ~tb ~tafts 
'lllaslyington. ~. <q:. 20~J!-~ 
March 16, 1982 
I 
Re: No. 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v. 
Bell 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
March 16, 1.982 
80-986 North Raven Board of Education v. Bell 
Harry: 
I am in dissent in this case, an~ inten~ to write. 









.§u:punu <!fonrl cf flrt ~b ~taft.t¥ 
~~!p:ttgto:n. ~. C!J. 211~'!~ 
JUSTICE W ... J . BRENNAN, JR. March 17, 1982 






cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
;:3lt.ttttmr (!fonrf of tl!r ~lttil.dt ;§tatr.S' 
f.t'L"lyingum. p. ~· 2o~>t2 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
March 22, 1982 
Re: 80-986 - North Haven Board of 
Education v. Bell 
Dear Harry, 








.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o 'CONNOR 
.$\uvrtutt Qill1lrt of tqt ~ni.ttlt .§tah.it' 
'Wrur'qmgton, '[a. <!f. 21l~JI.~ 
Mar ch 22, 1982 I 
Re: No. 80-896 North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 
Dear Harry: 
Although I find your opinion generally persuasive, I 
have two related concerns. The first is footnote 25, which 
suggests that the Department may investigate complaints of 
discrimination in programs not receiving federal funds. The 
second concern is footnote 29, which states that Title IX's 
provisions may be applicable "when employment discrimination has 
an adverse effect on federally funded programs or the 
beneficiaries of such programs, or when federal funds are not 
used directly to subsidize the institution's discriminatory 
practices but release other funds that are then used in a 
discriminatory fashion." The issues raised in these two 
footnotes were not presented to this Court for decision, and I am 
r~-luctant to join an opinion that effectively decides these 
issues without the benefit of an underlying record and full 
briefing. 
Because neither of these footnotes is necessary to your 
holding, would you consider deleting them from the opinion? 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§upum.t ~tntrt of tip• ~nUt~ j;tatte 
'J)t~;u.liyin.gftm.l£1. QJ. 2llc?'!-~ 
March 25, 1982 
Re: No. 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 
Dear Sandra: 
This is in response to your letter of March 22. I do 
not think that the two footnotes "effectively decide" the 
issues. I thought, instead, that they made clear the limits 
of the opinion. These footnotes, however, apparently 
disturb you, and I therefore shall eliminate them. A new 
draft will be around shortly. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
I' 
CHAMBERS 01' 
~nvr.cm.c ~llUrt of t~.c 1lnitcb ,§itaf.e.£> 
'J.lht.5lpngt.on, ~. (!}. 2.0,?'1-~ 




March 29, 1982 
No. 80-986 North Haven Board of Education 
v. Bell 
Dear Harry, 















TO: Mary OATF.: 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-986 North Haven 
I have read with interest the first draft of 
It is quite persuasive. 
Part I is excellent. 
Part II, addressing the legislative history, is a 
bit difficult to follow. This is understandable because the 
2history itself is a bundle of ambiguities, and in reading 
both the Court's opinion and your draft I find it difficult 
to follow the references and interrelationship Titles VI, 
VII and IX, and the sections thereof. My suggestions 
therefore, are tentative. 
I have dictated the attached rider as a possible 
~~ introductory paragraph in Part II. The J?resent first 
sentence iQ II, is not clear to me. Oo we lose anything by 
omitting the first paragraph altogether, and commencing 
discussion of the legislative history with the paragranh 
that begins at the bottom of page 6? 
On page 7, you make a good point in reliance on 
Chairman O'Hara's explanation of the background of Title IX • • 
But I find the sentence beginning seven lines from the 
bottom of page 7, unclear to one without a detailert 
familiarity with all of this. I am sure you had in mind 
that the reader would be familiar in detail with the Court's 
•' 
/ .... •• 
... 
opinion, but I think it best to make our dissent clear on 
its face. Therefore, we should identify or describe the 
Bayh am~ndment before referring to it. Moreover, it is not 
entirely accurate to sav that §904 "stated that the entire 
l3ayh amendment did not apply to emPloyment ••• " This 
requires some rephrasing, as a statute does not speak in 
terms of a Senator's amendment. 
I have suggested, in a rider, language changes in 
the last paragraph of Part II. 
Unless you have done so, you might take a look at 
the amicus hrief filed by the Equal Employment Advisory 
Council. Although l have not reread it, my impression is 
that it was quite helpful on the legislative history. 
Finally, I have suggested - by a rider - a 
somewhat different approach to our conclusion in Part III. 
You should take a close look at my language. I have not 






TO: Mary DATE: April 7, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-986 North Haven 
I have read with interest the first draft of your 
dissent. It is quite persuasive. 
Part I is excellent. 
Part II, addressing the legislative history, is a 
bit difficult to follow. This is understandable because the 
history itself is a bundle of ambiguities, and in reading 
both the Court's opinion and 
to follow the references and 
your draft I find it difficult 
interrelationshi~I, 
-\ 
VII and IX, and the sections thereof. My suggestions below, 
therefore, are tentative. 
I have dictated the attached rider as a possible 
introductory paragraph in Part II. The present first 
sentence in II, is not clear to me. Do we lose anything by 
omitting the first paragraph altogether, and commencing 
discussion of the legislative history with the paragraph 
that begins at the bottom of page 6? 
On page 7, you make a good point in reliance on 
Chairman O'Hara's explanation of the background of Title IX. 
But I find the sentence beginning seven lines from the 
bottom of page 7, unclear to one without a detailed 
familiarity with all of this. I am sure you had in mind 




opinion, but I think it best to make our dissent clear on 
its face. Therefore, we should identify or describe the 
Bayh amendment before referring to it. Moreover, it is not 
entirely accurate to say that §904 "stated that the entire 
Bayh amendment did not apply to employment " This 
requires some rephrasing, as a statute does not speak in .•. 
terms of a Senator's amendment. 
I have suggested, in a rider, language changes in 
the last paragraph of Part II. 
Unless you have done so, you might take a look at 
the amicus brief filed by the Equal Employment Advisory 
Council. Although I have not reread it, my impression is 
that it was quite helpful on the legislative history. 
Finally, I have suggested - by a rider - a 
somewhat different approach to our conclusion in Part III. 
You should take a close look at my language. I have not 
checked the accuracy of my statementf, 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
r .~ 
~ t. , 
~ . 
~Pril 8, 1982 
~ORTH GINA-POW 
To: Mary 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-986 North Haven Bd. v. Bell 
We mentioned the absurdity of thinking that Congress 
intended to add a third statute on sex discrimination. We 
miqht add a footnote that emphasizes some of the 
consequences of havinq different statutes, administered by 
different agencies, regulating the same private action. At 
the government level, there is a needless duplication of the 
bureaucracy. In this case, for example, the Department of 
Education must maintain a staff of employees to enforce the 
anti-discrimination responsibility. These will be employees 
wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Department of 
Education, and duplicative - at least to some extend - to 
the large staffs of EEOC and the Department of Labor. From 
the viewpoint of the educational institutions, they will be 
subject to regulation and oversight by different departments 
of government that may, or may not, have the same 
regulations and standards, require the filing of the same 
reports, etc. 
Our footnote also could develop, in more detail than my 




provisions of Title Vti and the absence of comparable 
provisions in the Education Act, the contrast in remedies, 
and - if I am ri.ght about it - the unwisdom and inequity of 
putting off funds (or the threat thereof) because a single 
person files a discri~ination charge. And what if that 
i.ndividual simultaneousJy moves under Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act). 
I may be exaggerating these problems. I do not recall 
that they were addressed particularly in the briefs. In 
view of your greater familiarity with the statutes, what do 
you think? 
L'FP, Jr • 
·. 
April 8, 1982 
NORTH GINA-POW 
To: Mary 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-986 North Haven Bd. v. Bell 
We mentioned the absurdity of thinking that Congress 
intended to add a third statute on sex discrimination. We 
might add a footnote that emphasizes some of the 
consequences of having different statutes, administered by 
different agencies, regulating the same private action. At 
the government level, there is a needless duplication of the 
bureaucracy. In this case, for example, the Department of 
Education must maintain a staff of employees to enforce the 
anti-discrimination responsibility. These will be employees 
wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Department of 
Education, and duplicative - at least to some exte~ - ~ 
the large staffs of EEOC and the Department of Labor. From 
the viewpoint of the educational institutions, they will be 
subject to regulation and oversight by different departments 
of government that may, or may not, have the same 
regulations and standards, require the filing of the same 
reports, etc. 
Our footnote also could develop, in more detail than my 




provisions of Title VII and the absence of comparable 
provisions in the Education Act, the contrast in remedies, 
and - if I am right about it - the unwisdom and inequity of 
~tting off funds (or the threat thereof) because a single 
person files a discrimination charge. (And what if that 
individual simultaneously moves under Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act) . 
I may be exaggerating these problems. I do not recall 
that they were addressed particularly in the briefs. In 





TO: Mary DA't'E: .April 15, 1982 
FROM: L~wis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-986 North Raven 
I have read your revised ~raft of 4/14, and think 
we are quite close to having a strong and well written 
dissent. 
I have done some light editing, and dictated three 
short riders for Part II, with no intent to change its 
substance. I think you have written Part II quite 
persuasively. 
My only substantial revisions are in ~art III, 
where you largely adopted draft language that I suggested. 
Thus, I was n?.\'ir it ing to some extent - and trying to improve 
- what I previously gave you. 
You will note in the margin on page 13 my 
suggestion that the paragraph there be moved to an 
appropriate place in Part II, as it relatec; directly to the 
legislative history. 
I have not tried to sort out the footnote::; in my 
revisions of Part III, as you can do that better than !. 
no not hesitate to edit my Part III revisions if 
you think this desirable. I want your judgment particularly 





On page 13 of his brief, the Solicitor General 
refers to administrative remedies under Title IX in addition 
to fund termination. Are any of these relevant as compared 
to the elaborate Title VII remedies? 
On minor point: The draft now refers 
inconsistently, perhaps, to HEW and to Department of 
Education. Perhaps we could put a note at the outset to the 
effect that the relevant department of government when Title 
IX was enadted was HEW, and that its responsibilities under 
Title IX were assumed by the DOP. when it was created. We 
could say that where appropriate references to HE'f7 should be 
read as meaning Department of Educati.on from and after it 
was created. 
When you have incorporated my editing and changes, 
unless you wish me to read any further changes, I suggest 
that you qo to a printed Chambers draft. Tt then can be 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.inprtmt <!j:ltltrl d tqt ~tb .itattg 
jirultingtott, ~. <!J. 2llbi'l-~ 
April 22, 1982 
Re: No. 80-986 North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 
Dear Lewis: 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~lqlTmt:t <!Jonrl .of tlrt 'Jlfuitt~ .§taft 
~as!ringtan. ;!B. cq. ZO?.l!~ 
April 23, 1982 
Re: No. 80-986 - North Hav~n Board of Education v. 
Bell, Secretary, Dept. of Education 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am not ready on this case for Wednesday ·release. It was 
listed as "tentative" in my earlier memo. 




April 29, 1982 
PERSONAL 
80-986 North Haven v. BelJ 
Dear Chief: 
When we ~entioned Nort~ Haven earli~r this 
afternoon, I had totally forgotten that on February 11 you 
assigned to me the task of writing a dissent. 
You and I were the only dissenters at Conference, 
and I have assumed that you were still wt th me. tH 11 
Rehnquist voted with the majority at ConferPnce, but he was 
persuaded by my dissent, and haq ioined it. If there are 
statements in the dissent that give you difficulty, I would 
be happy to ~iscuss them. 
It may be ~hen W@ werP talktnq that there was 
confusion as to Hydro level, another ("J\2 case in whi.ch I 
circulated a strong dissent from Harry's Court opinion and 
rather hoped you would join Me. rn Hydrolevel you voted 
tentatively "the other way" at Confer.ence. 
Sincerely, 













THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,§ttprmtt C!Jrotrl of tlrt ~ ~ ~ta:f.tg 
~rurfringwn. gt. <q. 2!1~'!$ 
April 29, 1982 
Re: 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 
Dear Lewis: 
Please JOln me ln your dissenting oplnlofr ln this case. 
Justice Powell 










CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§u:prmtt Qftmrl nf tq.t ~nit.dl .§tahs-
~aslp:nghrn. 1E. <!f. 2llgiJ!.$ 
April 29, 1982 
Re: No. 80-986 -North Haven Bo~rd of Education v. Bell 
Dear Harry: 
I continue to have problems with the breadth of 
the opinion and I will try to have a concurring draft 
out early next week when the "crunch" eases· up. 
Regards, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copi~s to the Conference -
~ 
~" r~ ~!k frJ- 1- 4:> 
~ I 0 ~ ?-1-- IS""~ dj ~ J-u-<_....., 4Z-~-
meb 05/04/82 ~ .a... ~ t.v--e ~ 
I 
4J.k..~ J-o ~ c;:f: 
To: Mr. Justice Pow~ll ~ ~ <jf t!?j .-n. 2 G, (~ 2.~.l /1 )'f(J 
~ /4 ~ 1-o ~~?~f-TTT l 1"4 
~ rrsJt> Hc..L j-4-£-h-Yr ~ ~
~~~~~~~~-
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-986, North Haven v. Bell d-'JI'--c..}r2.t-r ~  
H...,J-~ ~ ~ ~...&..,. r~·-e. ~ 
~ ~:r. ~d.d~S:.-s••-L"'~~ ~ 
I don't think the new version of North Haven touches us. I 
~'( ~-<2-'1 
would not add anything in response because I think any response ~ 
~~~A...>~-~~ 
would only detract from the streng~ of our arguments. (Their new 
circulation and our d~t~e~~· ~~J? 
The changes they make that you might want to respond to are 
footnotes 10 and 15. - Note 10 unfairly uses our argument about the 
ease with which the statute could have been written more clearly and 
uses it to buttress their reading by acting as if the statute only 
consists of the word "person." (if you want, we could make this 
point in a footnote.) 
Note 15 tries to save one of their arguments based on one 
---------> 
of Senator Bayh's statements by arguing that the inclusion of §1005 
in the particular sentence quoted was inadvertant (on the part of 
the Senator) • We could add a note stating that the ambiguous 
references to employment discrimination and Title IX could equally 
well be inadvertant (as the CAs have found) given that all 
place on the floor and it is clear that Senator Bayh was confused 
-~ 
-
about the exact scope of the various provisions of his amendment. 
In other words, there is no evidence to tell us which parts of his 
remarks were inadvertant. 
2. 
But I would not respond to this argument at all because its 
weakness is apparent on its face. The Court is relying almost 
entirely on three statements, none of which is free of ambiguity. 
If parts are also "inadvertant," one would think little weight 
should be placed on the statements in the absence of any more 
concrete evidence of which parts are inadvertant. 
meb 05/10/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: Suggested responses in No. 80-986, North Haven v. Bell 
1. Suggested new footnote to be called at end of first ~ in 
§ III, in response to last ~ of n. 26 of Court opinion, at 24. 
The Court maintains that by considerating these factors, we 
"second-guess" Congress, substituting our view for that of Congress. 
See n. 26, ante at . But we ordinarily presume that Congress acts 
in a reasonable manner. See xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (cite to an opinion by 
Justice Stewart that states this--the library knows that it exists, 
' 
and we should get the cite tomorrow when Steve Parken returns). 
This is a traditional rule of statutory construction based on the 
presumption that Congress, like other legislative bodies, usually 
does not act unreasonably in enacting legislation. See 2A c. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, §456.12, at 38 (4th ed. 1973). 
Any ambiguity in the statutory language--such as the Court 
apparently concededs, ante at ___ , should be resolved in light of 
this presumption of reasonableness. 
Any argument that the statute unambiguously supports the 
Court's position--and consideration of the reasonableness of various 
interpretations of the statute therefore should be avoided in 
2. 
deference to a decision made by Congress--would be difficult given 
the history of the issue at the appellate level. Twelve judges on 4 
Courts of Appeals thought that the plain language of the statute 
indicated that the statute did not ban employment discrimination~ 
se. See text at and n. 6, ante. Six judges on two Courts 
of Appeals thought the language of the statute ambiguous in at least 
some respects. See n. 6, supra. And, although 18 judges considered 
the statute language at the appeallate level, not a single one 
thought that the statute unambiguously banned employment 
discrimination per se in federally funded programs. 
2. Suggested addition (new ~) at end of n. 12, at 9, in 
f1~ lb a:st- t3 u 
response to ~a•t ~of 26~ of the ~t opinion .. 
The majority discounts this point because the inclusion of 
§1005 in this statement was "inadvertant." There is, of course, no 
firm proof that such was the case. Perhaps the Senator only 
included the statement about employment discrimination being banned 
in federally-funded programs because, under Title VII as amended by 
§1005 of the Bayh Amendment, such discrimination would now be banned 
in all educational programs, including federally-funded ones. 
Moreover, if parts of the Senator's remarks were 
inadvertant, how are we to know which ones were intented and which 
inadvertant? Perhaps the inadvertant statements were those that the 
Court reads as implying that employment discrimination per se is 
banned by Title IX. Most of the Courts of Appeals considering the 
question have agreed with the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit's assessment of the legislative history: 
"While it is true that there were occaisional lapses 
during the discussions, wherein one of the senators would 
telescope the sections [of the Bayh Amendment] , thereby 
suggesting that employment was to be covered under ••. 
Title IX, a careful examination of the debates •.• lead[s] 
us to conclude that these were the product of the 
imprecision of oral discussion rather than a reflection 
that the Act intended section 901 of Title IX to embrace 
progibitions against sex discrimination in employment." 
Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428 
(1979) • 
3. 
See also, e.g., Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995, cert. 
denied sub nom., Seattle University v. HEW, 44 ~4 u.s. 972 (1972). 
In Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, 585, cert. 
denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that the legislative history actually argued 
against extending Title IX to prohibit employment discrimation--
noting, for example, that Senator Bayh had commented that the 
remedies under Title VII are "extremely effective." Id., at 585 
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). 
3. Suggested new footnote at end of first sentence on p. 
12, responding to n. 10 of the Court's opinion. 
The Court sents our point in stating that the 
statute should be o cover employment discrimination 
because Congress could so easil use a word other than 
"person." See n. 10, ante. The does not consist solely of 
the word "person," nor does it proscribe rsons." Rather, it 
prohibits certain form of discrimination against persons, and the 
question presented is whether ployrnent discrimination per se is 
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DRAFT: NO. 80- , North Haven Board of Education v. 
Be 11 , e t • a 1 • , 
& Trumbull Board of Education v. u. S. 
~' Dept. of Education & Potz 
~ f POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
u.s.c. §1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the 
I 
basis of sex in education programs and activities 
receiving federal funds. Pursuant to this prov1s1on, the 
Department 
~ .W•~J~{!-IEW) ~ ltf7!>-
of 1\ Educatio~ b-as promulgated regulations 1 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in 
employment by fund recipients. 3 4 C. F. R. §106. 51 {a) {1) • 
Today, the Court upholds the validity of these 
regulations, relying on the statutory language, its 
legislative history, and several post-enactment events. 
2. 
Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither 
consistent with the statutory language nor compelled by ? 
( 
its legislative history, I dissent. 1 
I 
Although the majority begins with the language of 
the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its 
entirety only in the opening paragraphs of the opinion. 
In the section considering the statute's meaning, the 
Court quotes two words of the statute and 
paraphrases the rest of the relevant language, thereby 
suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the 
language used in the statute. Thus, according to the 
Court, "[s]ection 90l's broad directive that 'no person' 
may be discriminated against on the basis of gender 
appears, on its face, to include employees as well as 
students.". 
~~~~~~M..e 
Ante, at_.~ 4-/-L~~~. 
1Even the majorty states that the post-enactment 
events it discusses only "lend credence" to its 
interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 
In relevant part, the statute actually states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
" §901 {a) . 
3. 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, 
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving 
federal funding. It strains the language chosen by 
Congress to conclude that not only teachers and 
administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are 
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment, 
are thereby {i) denied participation in a program or 
activity2 ; { i i) denied the 
activity; or {iii) subject 
benefits of a program or 
(_.J.t.. 
to disrminination under an 
education program or activity. 
" M~ 
llll.Q,. although /f Congress 
~
made no reference~to employers or employees in Title IX, 
""/'iif4v ~~~-to e:2~~A-
it has bee-n quit ;~. explicfit..J ln other - ~atute's - regulating 
employment practices. 3 
It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts 
of Appeals ) considering the question before us) has reached 
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by 
the statutory language. The issue was presented first to 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro 
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 {CAl), 
2 I agree with the majority that employees who 
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers 
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by 
Title IX. See ante , at 
3 See, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 {Title VII: "[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
"); 29 u.s.c. §206 {d) {Equal Pay Act: "[n]o employer 
having employees ••.. "). 
v 
4. 
cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979), and that decision has 
been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider 
the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he 
language of section 901, 20 u.s.c. §1681, on its face, is 
aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies, i.e., 
either students attending institutions receiving federal 
funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded 
by the United States government." The court went on to 
point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific 
exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate 
to students, not employees. Ibid. 4~n the next appellate 
decision, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 
(CA6), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979), the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the interpretation 
fJt#W' ~~/ 
of the statute relied on by the Hlajor:bty, noting that "as 
" actually written, the statute is not nearly so broad. The 
words 'no person' are modified by later language which 
clearly limits their meaning." The court concluded that 
the statute "reaches only those types of disparate 
.. ~~ 'd . 
~ 1\ not only f1n s th1s point 
unconvincing, but concludes that the "absence of a 
specifc exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's 
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante, 
at (citation omitteg}. I am unable to follow this 
reasonin • ! ~ agree th~~he absence of employment-related 
except1ons is~ conclusive proof that employment is not 
within the scope of the statute since Congress may have 
intended to cover all employment. But I fail to see how 
that absence affirmat1vely indicates that the statute was 
meant to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did 
intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not 
provide exceptions similar to those in Title VII--for 
example, Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority 
plans, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment 
practices for Indians with regard to establishments 
operating on or near reservations, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(i). 
5. 
~ 
treatment" W'fli:eh A. involve discrimination against program 
beneficiaries. 5 
II 
egislative histroy of Title IX. at 
5The question has also been presented to the 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CAS), cert. denied, 444 u.S. 
972 (1972) the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit 
considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court o.r:~-(},-_A-
Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in oro. An /~ 
in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9 ~----
1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. 
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of 
~d. Appeals for the "'Bi~Rbh Circuit followed the three earlier 
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had 
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support 
HEW's position. Even the decision below, in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the 
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more 
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
c::---""' 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Ctty. School 
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert pending 
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023. 
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund 
termination to the offending program or activity. In 
reaching this decision, the court noted that program-
specific regulations might be sustainable in some 
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay 
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative 
to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. As 
noted by ¢ourt.>- of Appeals for the E.ifth Circtlit, an 
argument can be maae that in such a cas the the woman 
teacher is "denied the benefits bject to 
discrimination under" the feder Butl\ i.t is ' by 
that · 
.,.G if'c\1i-t would agree with the ma-je;r i ty that the statutory 
language would support rogram-specific regulations ~-----
f- ibi ting all kinds f discriminatory employment 
~ practices w1 to 11 types of employees, i.e., 




, ~~~~~~~, £J he earliest version of Title IX appeared in 
~ 
1970. Like the ve~sion~ finally enacted, the 1970 proposal 
would have amended Title VI I of the Ci vi 1 Rights Act of 
1964 as well as the Equal Pay Act to E xplici tly l prohibit I? 
discrimination in employment in educational institutions. 
See n. 12, ante. In addition, this original proposal 
}\ would have1 s implX} added the word "sex" to Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §2000d, which then 
would have prohibited discrimination in federally funded 
programs or activities on the basis of sex as well as 
"race, color, or national origin." See n. 12 at __ , 
ante. If Title VI had been amended, rather than a new 
Title IX enacted, it could not have been argued that the 
change banned employment discrimination in federally 
funded programs; Title VI includ~/\ g proviso 
stating that it covers only discrimination against program 
beneficiaries, not employees. 
..., U • S • C • § 2 0 0 Od- 3 • 6 
See Title VI, §604, 42 
In 1972, the version finally enacted as Title IX 
jJ /-~ r.-·-..,·.~ 
was introduced into the Senate. The model for this 
' ' provision [.:.emaine~ Tile VI, 7 but it was drafted as a new 
statute, Title IX, to be codified at 20 u.s.c. §1682 et 
6 42 u.s.c. §2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall 
be construed to authorize action under this 
subchapter by any department or agency with 
respect to any department or agency or labor 
organization except where a primary objective of 
the Federal financial assistance is to provide 
employment." 
0-
7The oper~ ive language in the two provisions 
virtually identical. Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d {Title 




seq., rather than as a modification of Titl The 
reason for this change was strategic, not 
supporters feared that if Title VI for 
amendment, Title VI itself would be in da er of being 
"gutted" on the floor of the Congress. Sex iscrimination 
Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Education and Labor, House of Representativ s--Review of 
regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
p. 409 (1975). [ 
Moreover, the House version of Title IX 
originally contained a provision, §904, equivalent to §604 
of Title VI, explicitly stating that Title IX did not 
apply to discrimination in employment per se~ As noted by 
the Court, ante 
the Conference. 
----
at , this provision was eliminated by 
- AA-t-~r---~ .... r 
But in 19 7 5 hear i gs before the House 
'\ 
Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, 
while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, 
noted that this change was mad~ at conference simply to 
eliminate a drafting error with as little trouble as 
possible. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House 
of Representatives--Review of regulations to implement 
Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Section 
904 stated that the entire Bayh amendment did not apply to 
employment--but of course, the Bayh amendment included 
~ 
changes ~ Title VI I and the Equal Pay Act in order to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in employment. 
Since the analogous provision of Title VI (§604) had been 
regarded as a mere clarification, 8 the -rr~ is on 




~weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's 
use of the ritualistic words "the House receeded" 
indicates a substantive change. As this Court noted in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 770-711, 
when ~d Title IX, CoR~<ess~expected the new 
provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, 
which had been used as its model.9 
In arguing that the legislative history indicates 
Title IX was 
discrimination, 
intended to extend to 
the m~ relies heavily 
employment 
on three 
statements of a single senator. The first st~meAt, ante 
at (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), 
ambiguous. It ~s ..true tht!t Senator Bayh 
is !,~ 
state ~ 
faculty employment will be covered by his amendment after 
mentioning the provision enacting Title IX but prior to 
any mention of the provisions amending Title VII and the 
~ 
Equal Pay Act. Btlt Dayfi ] mmediately thereafte~tate~ v ~ 
that Title IX's enforcement powers parallel those in Title 
VI--and Title VI has never provided for fund termination 
to redress discrimination in employment. Next, the Court 
quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 
8 See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement 
of Attorney General Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on 
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman Celler, 
House Floor Manager of Title VI). 1 ~ . uL ~~r~-
--~ 9The Court cites th se same pages in Cannon for the 
proposition that it is C ngress's intent in 1972, not 1964 
(when Title VI was passed) that is determinative here. 
Ante at . This is, of course, true. But the point J 
made by t1i"'e Cannon Co rt was that when Congress passe6_.r ~ f.tlltl. 
Title IX, it p'ssHme-d i tle IX would mean what Title VI -~ 
appeared to mean in 19 2. This aspect of Cannon support~ 
m;r dissent, A~ the · ' , s1nce 
r~ does not suggest that t thought 
VI applied to employmen per se. 
~~ 
~A:f1A ,· ~u 
~ ie. ~ ~-/-!­
~~~+--1-c> /..-.. 7 
~~-
9. 
1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) 
"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in 
all areas," including employment. Ante at (quoting 
118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)) . But, §100 5 of the Bayh 
amendment is the section amending Title VII and thus 
§§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of 
whether Title IX does.10 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the 
second Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of 
federally assisted programs and activities is 
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition 
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of · 
sex. In order to close thi~ loophole, my 
amendment sets fohth prohibition and enforcement 
provisions wh~h generally parallel the 
provisions of title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 
(1972) (in elipses ante at __ ). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that 
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title 
it. 
VI rather than as a substantial departure from J~
In the third Bayh statement, ante at (quoting 
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator is responding to 
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the 
~
~ assumes that each sentence in that response 
"\. 
refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit noted in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy .•. , as 
well as the discussion immediately preceding and 
following the above-quoted passage, indicates 
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into 
three sections, two of which were specificatlly 
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the 
third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's · response was more extended than it needed 
10 In Bayh's amendment, §§1001-1004 address 
discrimination in federally funded programs: §1001 is 
Title IX. Section 1005 amends Title VII, and §§1009 & 
1010 amend the Equal Pay Act. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). 
9. 
1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) 
"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in 
all areas," including employment. Ante at (quoting 
118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, §100 5 of the Bayh 
amendment is the section amending Title VII and thus 
§§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of 
whether Title IX does.10 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the 
second Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of 
federally assisted programs and activities is 
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition 
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of · 
sex. In order to close thiB loophole, my 
amendment sets fohth prohibition and enforcement 
provisions wh~h generally parallel the 
provisions of title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 
(1972) (in elipses ante at __ ). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that 
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title 
it. 
VI rather than as a substantial departure from l~tle VI~ 
In the third Bayh statement, ante at (quoting 
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator is responding to 
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the 
~
~ assumes that each sentence in that response 
'\ 
refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit noted in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy •.• , as 
well as the discussion immediately preceding and 
following the above-quoted passage, indicates 
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into 
three sections, two of which were specificatlly 
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the 
third at employees (employment) • While Senator 
Bayh's · response was more extended than it needed 
10In Bayh's amendment, §§1001-1004 address 
~iscrimination in federally funded programs: §1001 is 
Title IX. Section 1005 amends Title VII, and §§1009 & 
1010 amend the Equal Pay Act. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). 
/ 
to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s 
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We 
think this particularly in light of the fact 
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not 
as prescise as a response in written form, •••. " 
59 3 F • 2d , a t 4 2 7 • 
~~ii 
lfp/ss 04/07/82 
Rider B, p. 10 (North Haven) 
NORTHlOA SALLY-POW 
view, it is fair Rather than support the court's 
to say that the legislative history accords with the 




The majority has allowed statements of one 
/ supporter of a statute to determine its interpretation. 
In the past~ this Court has held that "[t]he remarks of a 
legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling 
legislative history." Chrysler Corp. v. 
441 u.s. 281, 311 {1979). The majority 
nevertheless relies on such remarks, ignoring their 
~~ 
ambiguity and the).. Senato:_c :fail~ to understand the 
differences between his amendment and its model, because 
the legislation is the result of a floor amendment and the 
Senator's remarks are "the only authoritative indications 
of congressional intent regarding the scope" of Title IX. 
Ante, at Because I consider the statutory language 
authoritative, I dissent. As Justice Jackson warned in 
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384,, 395-
/ 
11. 
96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), "to select casual 
statements from floor debates, not always distinguished 
for candor or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds 
what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute 
ourselves for the Congress in one of its important 
functions •..• "' 
' . 
' . lfp/ss 04/07/82 Rider A, p. 10 (North Haven) 
NORTHlO SALLY-POW 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of 
§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
(Mary, here repeat the langauge you have on p. 3 
of your draft identing it). 
The Court concludes that this language must be read to 
proscribe sex discrimination in employment by educational 
institutions that receive financial assistance under Title 
IX. I submit that no lawyer, asked to read the foregoing 
language alone, would think it had anything to do with the 
employment practices of schools. An employee of a school 
is not thought of as "participating in, or denied the 
benefits of" an "education program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance". There could be part time 
2. 
. . 
employees who also participated in such a program, but 
that is not what the Court holds today. The respondents 
who initiated these cases are two women seeking full time 
reemployment, and neither claims to being a participant in 
or to receive benefits of federal funding except in the 
tangential way that federal funds may aid the recipient 
schools in meeting general operating expenses. 
If the draftsmnn of Title IX, and particularly 
of §901 - presumably one or more lawyers - had been 
instructed to include sex discrimination in employment, it 
cannot be argued seriously that the language of this 
section would have been written as above set forth. And 
whatever the skills of the draftsman may have been, the 
precedents of the anti-discrimination language in Titles 
VI and VII, presumptively would provided models for the 
. . 
3. 
§901 language • We thus have a situation where the Court, 
presumably to reach a result deemed desirable, puts common 
sense aside and undertakes an elaborate examination of an 
ambiguous legislative history to conclude that after all 
Congress meant something it had not said. 
Apart from statements of one supporter of Title 
IX, there is no substantial legislative history that 
supports the Court's interpretation.* 
*Mary, you might add a footnote here discounting as 




. . The most dependable sources of legislative 
intent are the reports of the responsible committees. 
Nothing in either of these reports lends support to the 
Court's conclusion. Indeed, the Senate rejected a version 
of Title IX introduced by Senator McGovern, that would 
have expanded the bill specifically to include employment 
practices. The Court, in light of this legislative 
record, was forced to rely almost exclusively on 
fragmentary statements by one supporter of the statute. 
We previously have emphasized that "[t]he remarks of a 
single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling 
in analyzing legislative history. Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 u.s. 281, 311 (1979). 
It seems to me that the Court also disregards 





legislative body would have intended. There was no need 
to enact another statute proscribing employment 
discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of 
sex. Title VII and the Equal Pay Act had already met 
fully this legislative need.* 
*Mary - if as I recall the SG conceded the reespondents 
had remedies available under Title VII, add a note. 
6 • 
. . 
. . Moreover, Title IX was to be administered by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act were administered by the Department 
of Labor and EEOC. It seems beyond rational belief that 
Congress would have intended not only duplicative 
legislation but then placed its enforcement in the hands 
of a different department of government. Speaking of 
enforcement, Title VII - a comprehensive anti-
discrimination statute - contains carefully prescribed 
procedures for conciliation, for oversight by EEOC, and 
finally for federal court remedies. This structured 
procedure is to be contrasted with the only remedy - an 
overkill type of remedy - provided by Title IX: the 
cutting off of funds, thereby penalizing innocent people. 




' . F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (CA6) 
cert. den., 44 u.s. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
(Mary: Copy here the quote from Romeo I 
reprinted on page 104 of petitioner's brief.) 
The Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the 
federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the 
Romeo Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited 
expertise in employment matters. Its view is 
that employment cases are better resolved under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provides more appropriate remedies for such 
cases." Brief, p. 37. 
7. 
In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated 
on three assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to 
Congress: (i) that it was incapable or neglgected, to 
state with any degree of clarity what a first year law 
student should have been able to state, (ii) that it 
enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in 
8. 
' . the absence of any showing of a need therefor, and (iii) 
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce of the 
third statute in the Department of Education that 
concededly lacks the experience and the qualifications to 
oversee and enforcement employment legislation. 
lfp/ss 04/07/82 Rider A, p. 10 (North Haven) 
NORTHlO SALLY-POW 
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§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
(Mary, here repeat the langauge you have on p. 3 
of your draft identing it). 
The Court concludes that this language must be read to 
proscribe sex discrimination in employment by educational 
institutions that receive financial assistance under Title 
IX. I submit that no lawyer, asked to read the foregoing 
language alone, would think it had anything to do with the 
employment practices of schools. An employee of a school 
is not thought of as "participating in, or denied the 
benefits of" an "education program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance". There could be part time 
2. 
employees who also participated in such a program, but 
that is not what the Court holds today. The respondents 
who initiated these cases are two women seeking full time 
reemployment, and neither claims to being a participant in 
or to receive benefits of federal funding except in the 
tangential way that federal funds may aid the recipient 
schools in meeting general operating expenses. 
If the draftsmnn of Title IX, and particularly 
of §901 - presumably one or more lawyers - had been 
instructed to include sex discrimination in employment, it 
cannot be argued seriously that the language of this 
section would have been written as above set forth. And 
whatever the skills of the draftsman may have been, the 
precedents of the anti-discrimination language in Titles 




§901 language. we thus have a situation where the Court, 
presumably to reach a result deemed desirable, puts common 
sense aside and undertakes an elaborate examination of an 
ambiguous legislative history to conclude that after all 
Congress meant something it had not said. 
Apart from statements of one supporter of Title 
IX, there is no substantial legislative history that 
supports the Court's interpretation.* 
*Mary, you might add a footnote here discounting as 




The most dependable sources of legislative 
intent are the reports of the responsible committees. 
Nothing in either of these reports lends support to the 
Court's conclusion. Indeed, the Senate rejected a version 
of Title IX introduced by Senator McGovern, that would 
have expanded the bill specifically to include employment 
practices. The Court, in light of this legislative 
record, was forced to rely almost exclusively on 
fragmentary statements by one supporter of the statute. 
We previously have emphasized that "[t]he remarks of a 
single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling 
in analyzing legislative history. Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 u.s. 281, 311 (1979). 
It seems to me that the Court also disregards 




legislative body would have intended. There was no need 
to enact another statute proscribing employment 
discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of 
sex. Title VII and the Equal Pay Act had already met 
fully this legislative need.* 
*Mary - if as I recall the SG conceded the reespondents 
had remedies available under Title VII, add a note. 
6. 
Moreover, Title IX was to be administered by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act were administered by the Department 
of Labor and EEOC. It seems beyond rational belief that 
Congress would have intended not only duplicative 
legislation but then placed its enforcement in the hands 
of a different department of government. Speaking of 
enforcement, Title VII - a comprehensive anti-
discrimination statute - contains carefully prescribed 
procedures for conciliation, for oversight by EEOC, and 
finally for federal court remedies. This structured 
procedure is to be contrasted with the only remedy - an 
overkill type of remedy - provided by Title IX: the 
cutting off of funds, thereby penalizing innocent people. 
The District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (CA6) 
cert. den., 44 u.s. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
(Mary: Copy here the quote from Romeo I 
reprinted on page 104 of petitioner's brief.) 
The Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the 
federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the 
Romeo Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited 
expertise in employment matters. Its view is 
that employment cases are better resolved under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provides more appropriate remedies for such 
cases." Brief, p. 37. 
7. 
In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated 
on three assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to 
Congress: (i) that it was incapableAor neglgected, to 
state with any degree of clarity whatA~~'  ~ ~J 
SJ:P~]d R-a-ve ee-en able t o....., st:....a-te, (ii) that it 
enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in 
·. 
8. 
of any showing of a need therefor, and (iii) 
it vested the authority to enforce ~the 
third statute in the Department of Education that 
concededly lacks the experience and the qualifications to 
oversee and enforce~t employment legislation. 
~- 9~-~~51~ 
~~~~~~~ 
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HAVENS SALLY-POW 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of 
Title IX "does not expressly include .•• employees". It 
relies on the negative fact that neither does §901 
"exclude employees from its scope". Ante, at 9. The 
Court then turns to the "legislative history for evidence 
as to whether or not §901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination". Id. I agree with the several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the 
statutory language cannot fairly be read to proscribe 
employee discrimination. Only rarely may legislative 
' ~ 
history be relied upon to read into a statute substant4a± 
language that Congress itself did not include. At least, 
the legislative history must show clearly and 
2 0 
unequivocally that Congress did intend what it failed to 
say. The Court's elaborate exposition of the history of 
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The Court's decision today is another example of 
reaching to obtain a result perceived to be desirable. 
jJ-
/ 
doing so, it largely ignored the language of the statute 
itself, and relied upon HEW's strained interpretation of 
In 
._; 
this language. In doing so, it rejected the views of six 
courts of Appeals - each of which had concluded that HEW's 
regulation could not be reconciled with the statutory 
language. The Court turned for support to the legislative 
history. There is not a word in the reports of either the 
Senate or House that suggests that Title IX was an 
additional statute intended to prohibit discrimination in 
employment. (Mary, am I right about this?) But comfort 
was found in statements on the floor of the Senate by a 
/ 
2. 
sponsor of Title IX, Senator Bayh, that - as indicated 
above - at least are ambiguous if not indeed reflecting 
misunderstanding. We held that "[t)he remarks of a single 
legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in 
analyzing legislative history". Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 u.s. 281, 311 (1979). Moreover, there was no reason 
for Congress to include anti-discrimination provisions 
within Title IX, a statute that addressed an entirely 
different purpose. Other statutes, then on the books, 
were specifically enacted to proscribe employment 
discrimiantion in all of its aspects. In addition to 
Titel VI, the comprehensive legislation is Title VII that 
also contains carefully prescribed procedures for 
conciliation, for oversight by the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commissions, and finally for federal court 
! 
3. 
remedies. Counsel for the government conceded, at oral 
argument, that the discrimination alleged in this case was 
within the jurisdiction of Title VII and all of its 
remedies. The Court today offers no explanation of why 
the Congress may have wished to provide duplicative 
legislation, especially as a "tag on" to a statute with an 
entirely different purpose. Moreover, the only remedy 
provided for a violation of Title IX is the cutoff of 
federal funds to the educational institution - a drastic 
remedy penalizing innocent people and one hardly designed 
as appropriate for alleged discrimination in the failure 
by each of two schools, petitioners in this case, to 
reemploy a single individual. 
In sum, today's decision of this Court supplies 




clear by Congress, or for which any need can be imagined 
in light of specific legislation dealing carefully and 
broadly with employment discrimination. As it seems to me 
that restraint appropriate to the Judicial Branch is 




DRAFT: NO. 80-986, North Haven Board of Education v. 
Be 11 , e t • a 1 • , 
& Trumbull Board of Education v. u. S. 
Dept. of Education & Potz 
POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
u.s.c. §1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex in education programs and activities 
.. R- 147s-
receiving federal funds. Ptrr-suant to ~is provisioR;;\ the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW} 
promulgated regulations ~ft.C975 prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 
34 C.F.R. §106.51 (a} (1}. Today, the Court upholds the 
validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory 
language, its legislative history, and several post-
2. 
enactment events. Because I believe the Court's 
interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory 
language nor~y its legislative history, I 
dissent.l 
I 
Although the majority begins with the language of 
the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its 
entirety only in the opening paragraphs of the opinion. 
In the section considering the statute's meaning, the 
Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the 
rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at 
odds with the language used in the statute. Thus, 
according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's broad directive 
that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the basis 
of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as 
well as students." Ante, at This is not ~ what 
-------,,-&.C~ ~~~ 
lEv-en- 1 he 1\--ma~o:rity staee~ that the post-enactment 
events it discusses only "lend credence" to its 
interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 
the statutory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute «e~~lly states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
" Education Amendments of 1972, §90l(a}, 20 
u.s.c. §1681 (a}. 
3 0 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, 
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving 
lD~ 
federal funding. It ~raiR5 the language chosen by 
Congress to conclude that not only teachers and 
administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are 
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment, 
are thereby (i} denied participation in a program or 
activity2 ; (ii} denied the benefits of a program or 
activity; or (iii} subject to discrimination under an 
education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made no 
reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX, 
~
in contrast to quite explict language in other statutes 
" regulating employment practices. 3 
It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts 
of Appeals to consider the question before us has reached 
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by 
the statutory language. The issue was presented initially 
2 I agree with the majority that employees who 
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers 
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by 
Title IX. See ante , at 
3see, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i)t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
"}; 29 u.s.c. §206 (d) (1} (Equal Pay Act: "[n)o employer 
having employees ...• "}. 
4. 
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro 
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), 
cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979), and that decision has 
been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider 
the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he 
language of section 901, 20 u.s.c. §1681, on its face, is 
aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies, i.e., 
either students attending institutions receiving federal 
funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded 
by the United States government." The court went on to 
point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific 
exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate 
to students, not employees. 4 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community 
Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 u.s. 
972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on 
by this Court, noting that "as actually written, the 
statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are 
Court today not only finds this point 
unconvincing, but concludes that the "absence of a 
specifc exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's 
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante, 
at (citation omitteq). I am unable to follow this 
reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof thab employment is not within / 
the scope of the statu~e since Congress may have intended -z? 
to cover all employmen . But I fail to see how that . 
absence affirmatively · icates that the statute was .meany ~-t.e...d.· 
d.a to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to ~ 
f~ cover employees, it is anomalous that it did~not provide , n exceptions similar to those in Title VI I fllpr example, 
~ Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority plans, 42 
u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment of Indians 
at establishments operating on reservations, 42 u.s.c. 
§2000e-2 (i). 
5. 
modified by later language which clearly limits their 
meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The court concluded that 
the statute "reaches only those types of disparate 
treatment" that involve discrimination against program 
beneficiaries. 5 Ibid. 
II 
A 
The court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of 
5The question has also been presented to the 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CAB), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
972 (1972) the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit 
considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro. 
And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9 
1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. 
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier 
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had 
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support 
HEW's position. Even/\ the decision below, in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the 
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more 
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School 
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert pending 
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023. 
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund 
termination to the offending program or activity. In 
reaching this decision, the court noted that program-
specific regulations might be sustainable in some 
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay 
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative 
~ to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. ~ 
l!r noted 'b"y theft co-tir~ .,_, an argument can be made that in such 
a case, ~ the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" 
or "subject to discrimination under" the federal program. 
But there is no indication it would agree with this Court 
that the statutory language supports program-specific 
regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory 
employment practices with respect to all types of 
employees, i.e., secretaries and administrators as well as 
teachers. 
" l 
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Title IX as finally enacted was part of a Senate 
bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1972), added - through 
an amendment sponsored by Senator Bayh. Loopholes in 
earlier civil rights legislation had been identified in 
hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
-r r? 
. . 
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With the purpose of closing these loopholes, the 
Bayh floor amendment (Amendment No. 874) was introduced in 
1972. See 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of 
amendment) . 
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Title IX as finally enacted was part of ;(nate 
bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1972), added (. through 
~ - r 
an ~ent sponsored by Senator Bayh. Loopholes in 
/A . 
earlier civil rights legislation had been identified in 
hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
6. 
Title IX "does not expressly include . employees." 
But it finds a strong negative inference from the fact 
that §901 does not "exclude employees from its scope". 
Ante, at The Court then turns to the "legislative 
history for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant 
to prohibit employment di scr iminat ion". Ibid. I agree 
with the several Courts of Appeals that have concluded 
unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be 
read to proscribe employee discrimination. Only rarely may 
legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute 
language that Congress itself did not include. To justify 
such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must 
show clearly and unequivocally that Congress did intend 
what it failed to state. 6 The Court's elaborate 
exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of 
this standard. ~-· ---··-· ....... ---·-............. - Nb-... ···~~---.,.------
Title IX was enacted to close three loopholes in 
\
earlier civil rights legislation; each involved / 
~crimination in educational institutions.r Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion, or national origin, did not apply to 
discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals 
to perform work connected with the educational activities 
of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, title 
VII, §702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
6see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. 
Volpe, 410 u.s. 402, 412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this 
ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we 
must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the 
legislative intent."). 
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The Bayh floor amendment (Amendment No. 874) 
was introduced in 1972/ ~e 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) 




u.s.c. §206{d) {1), but it did not apply to administrative, 
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. 
See 29 u.ss.c. §213{a) {1970) {no longer in force). 
Finally, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
u.s.c. §2000d, barred discrimination on the basis of 
11 race, color, or national origin, .. but not sex, in any 
federally funded programs and activities. 
introduced a fl;or -.} 
amendment, Amendment 874 {the Bayh amendment), which ~ 
Congress subsequently enacted, to close these loopholes. 
In 1972, Senator Bayh 
See 118 Cong . .Rec. 5803 {1972) {print of amendment] )!'. In 
·~ .... "'-
§§ 1001-1003 of the Amendent, a new Title IX was created, 
banning discrimination on the basis of sex in federally 
funded educational programs and activities, thus 
effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex 
discriminati~.~~that amendment amended 
" ~ Title VII to cover employmentAin educational institutions. 
Ibid. And §§ 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even 
for teachers and other professionals. Ibid. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in 
educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 
1001-1003 of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such 
discrimination. Instead, Title I~presumablyJ\enacted, 
't 1 ~ 1t~b - d' ~~t' . t as 1 s anguage s
11 
to ar 1 scr 1m1na 10n aga1ns 
beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities. 
~This in~erpretation~itle IX • eeei ¥es i~<6~
f~.f;;t, modelled after Title VI of the Civil 
1\ 
Rights Act of 1964. 7 Title VI ~y was limited in its 
Footnote{s) 7 will appear on following pages. 
\ 
8. 
scope to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally 
funded programs, not general employment practices of fund 
recipients. 42 u.s.c. §2000d-3. And, as this Court noted 
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 770-711 
(1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new 
provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, 
which had been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to 
the proper inte~etation of Title IX for two reasons. 
First, ~ notes that "[i] t is Congress' intention 
1\ 
in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in 
interpreting Title IX." Ante, at (citing Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 710-711 (1979). This 
point begs the question, however, since there is no 
evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress 
thought Title VI applied to employment discrimination. . 
~ 4 ~ ~ 1-vr d_,_··~+<..~~ 
The seH:d reason A t~t-. dis£.-Q~arest\Ti tle VI is that 
~·Yt, ' unlike Title IX, includes a section, i.e. §604, 
42 u.s.c. §2000d-3, exressly stating that Title VI applies 
only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to 
employment discrimination per se. But in an earlier 
version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, 
Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, 
but the reason for this approach was strategic, not 
substantive. Supporters feared that if Title VI were 
7The opertive language in the two provisions is 
virtually identical. Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d (Title VI) 
with 20 u.s.c. §168la . (Title IX). 
9. 
opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on 
the floor of the Congress. Sex Discrimination 
Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary 
Education and Labor, House of Representatives--Review of 
regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and 
IX, the Court stresses ~ that the House version of the 
Senate's Bayh Amendment originally contained a provision, 
§1004, equivalent to §604 of Title VI, explicitly stating 
that no section of the 1972 legislation applied to 
discrimination in employment, but this provision was 
eliminated by the Conference. Ante, at A strong 
argument~ be made that there was a non-
substantive reason for eliminating §1004 from the House 
bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on 
Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, 
Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the 
background of Title IX to a witness, noted that this 
change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives--Review of regulations to implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without 
reference to Senator O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House 
bill and the Senate's Bayh Amendment, §100 4 of the House 
bill was a drafting mistake; it stated that no section of 
the House bill applied to employment, though sections of 
the House Bill, as well as the Senate version, made 
express changes to the employment diescrimination 
provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Since the 
analogous provision of Title VI, §604, had been regarded 
~
as a mere clarification, 8 the majo r iky is on weak ground 
in arguing that the Conference Report's use of the 
ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a 
substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an 
obvious drafting error at a very late stage in the 
legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history 
indicates Title IX was intended to extend to employment 
discrimination, the Court is forced to rely~
A 
three statements of a single senator. The first 
statement, ante at (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 
(1972))' is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did state that 
faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after 
mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any 
mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 
Immediately thereafter, however, he stated that Title 
IX' s enforcement powers paralle~those in Title VI~~ 
~~Title VI has never provided ; or fund terminatio
redress discrimination in employment.~Next, the Court 
quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 
1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) 
"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in 
all areas," including employment. Ante at (quoting 
118 Con g . Re c • 58 0 7 ( 19 7 2) ) • But, §100 5 of the Bayh 
8see, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement 
of Attorney General Kennedy)~ Civil Rights: Hearings on 
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman Celler, 
House Floor Manager of Title VI). 
11. 
amendment is the section amending Title VII and thus 
§§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of 
whether Title IX does. 9 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the 
second Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of 
federally assisted programs and activities is 
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition 
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of 
sex. In order to close this loophole, my 
amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement 
provisions which generally parallel the 
provisions of title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 
(1972) (in elipses ante at __ ). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that 
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title 
VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante at (quoting 
~ 
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator ~responding to 
.;t 
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the 
Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers 
to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit noted in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy •.• , as 
well as the discussion immediately preceding and 
following the above-quoted passage, indicates 
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into 
three sections, two of which were specifically 
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the 
third at employees (employment) . While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed 
to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s 
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We 
think this particularly in light of the fact 
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not 
as prescise as a response in written form, " 
593 F. 2d, at 427. 
Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair 
9see description of various sections of the Bayh 
Amendment, supra at See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 
(1972) (print of amendment) • 
.. 
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In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated 
on four assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to 
Congress: (i) Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed 
to include familiar language in §901, that would have made 
clear its intent; (ii) Congress enacted a third statute 
proscribing sex discrimination in employment in 
educational institutions in the absence of any showing of 
a need for the third; and (iii) that it failed to include 
in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial 
provisions relevant to employment discrimination; and (iv) 
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third 
statute in the Department of Education, a department 
which, even the Soliciter General concedes, lacks the 
2 0 
.. 





> . . 
' . 
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Specifically, the cutoff of funds would be at the 
expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, 
without remeding injustice to the employee. ~itle IX 
contains no provision for back pay or restoration of 
seniority rights. Indeed, it even fails to mandate 
employment or promotion to rectify discrimination. Title 
IX, by comparison with the other employment discrimination 
statutes, is deficient also in other respects: there are 
no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and 
no guidance as to procedure. The Solicitor General 
conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the 
two employees who initiated this suit was availale under 
Title VII. 13 See transcript of oral argument, 27. 
) 
.. 
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity 
of §901, that we must look to the "legislative history for 
evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to prohibit 
employment discrimination". Ante, at In addition 
to what is normally embraced by the term "legislative 
history" the Court ignores other factors highly relevant 
to intent: they include whether the ambiguity easily 
could have been avoided by the legislative draftsman: 
whether Congress has prior experience in legislative with 
respect to the identical purpose now attributed to it: and 
whether other legislation clearly and specifically already 
addressed this purpose. If these factors are considered, 
2. 
it is not an overstatement to say that it makes little 
sense to read employment discrimination into §901. 
If there had been an intent to include sex 
discrimination in employment, no legislative draftsman -
even a draftsman of modest accomplishments - would not 
have written it as above set forth. Moreover, the 
draftsman would have been guided by the employment 
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
that specifically deal with this problem. 
Indeed, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were the 
statutes previously enacted by Congress to deal expressly 
with employment discrimination, and at the same time new 
Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII and 
the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe 




institutions on the basis of sex. It is not easy to 
believe that Congress intended to enact a third statute 
addressing this identical problem, and that it chose 
language ambiguous at best and in important respects 
inconsistent with the other two statutes. 
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity of this 
language, that we must look to the "legislative history 
for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to 
prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at 
Although the Court examined at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignored other factors highly 
relevant to intent: they include whether the ambiguity 
easily could have been avoided by the legislative 
draftsman; whether Congress had prior experience in 
legislating with respect to the identical subject; and 
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately 
proscribed the conduct in question. When these factors 
are considered, it is not an overstatement to say that it 
2. 
; 
makes little sense to read sex employment discrimination 
language into §901. 
If there had been such an intent, no legislative 
draftsman - even one of modest accomplishments - would 
have written §901 as above set forth. Moreover, the 
draftsman would have been guided easily by the employment 
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
that specifically addresses this problem. These two 
statutes had been enacted previously by Congress to deal 
expressly with employment discrimination. At the same 
time Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe 
specifically employment discrimination in educational 
institutions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly could 
3 • 
. ; 
have intended to enact a third statute addressing this 
identical problem, choosing language ambiguous at best. 
. . 
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, the cutoff of funds would be at --------
the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the federally 
funded program. Title IX contains no provision for back 
pay or restoration of seniority rights. Indeed, it even 
contains no provision requiring employment or promotion to 
rectify discrimination. Title IX, by comparison with the 
other employment discrimination statutes, is deficient 
also in other respects: there are no time limits for 
action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to 
procedure. The Solicitor General conceded at oral 
argument that appropriate relief for the two employees who 
initiated this suit was availale under Title VII. 13 See 
transcript of oral argument, 27. 
.·· 
).:.. 
I ' ... 
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As indicated above, where the critical words -
in this ca~ "employment discrimination~ absent from 
the statutory language and its meaning is otherwise clear, 
reliance on the legislative history to add the omitted 
words is rarely appropriate. Only if the legislative 
history is clear and unequivocal as to congressional 
intent, should a court supply what Congress failed to 
include. W,R.atQvi! r e~~ --may -Be sa te a l:!#&t lh~ legislative 
history today relied upon by the Cour~~ is not clear 
and unequivocal. 
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity of this 
language, that we must look to the "legislative history 
for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to 
prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at ----
Although the Court examined at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignored other factors highly 
relevant to intent: they include whether the ambiguity 
easily could have been avoided by the legislative 
draftsman~ whether Congress had prior experience in 
legislating with respect to the identical subject; and 
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately 
proscribed the conduct in question. When these factors 
are considered, it is not an overstatement to say that it 
2. 
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makes little' sense to ~ sex employment discrimination 
LM.I d ;taft~e:~e inE<>A§901. 
If there had been such an intent, no legislative 
draftsman - even one of modest accomplishments - would 
have written §901 as above set forth. Moreover, the 
draftsman would have been guided easily by the employment 
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
that specifically addresses this problem. These two 
statutes had been enacted previously by Congress to deal 
expressly with employment discrimination. At the same 
time Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe 
specifically employment discrimination in educational 
institutions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly could 
3. 
have intended to enact a third statute addressing this 





to say that the legislative history accords with the 
natural reading of the statute. Title IX prohibits 
discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally 
' funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX 
~
is modelled after Title VI, wfl±eh is explicitly so 
limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can 
be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of 
§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
" §901 (a). 
The Court concludes that this language must be read to 
proscribe sex discrimination in employment by educational 
institutions that receive financial assistance under Title 
IX. If the dr aftsm~n of Title IX, and particularly of 
§901--presumably one or more lawyers--had been instructed 
to include sex discrimination in employment, it cannot be 
argued seriously that the section would have been written 
as set forth above. I submit that no lawyer, asked to 
read the foregoing language alone, would think it had 
anything to do with the employment practices of schools. f 
is not thought of as I 
"participating in, or denied the benefits of" an 
"education program or activity receiving federal financial / 
assistance ... 10 Moreover, regardless of the skills of the 
An employee school of a 
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages. 
12. 
to say that the legislative history accords with the 
natural reading of the statute. Title IX prohibits 
discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally 
-funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX 
~
is modelled after Title VI, wflteb is explicitly so 
limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can 





:me before us is the meaning of 
?eat the relevant language: 
United States shall, on the 
luded from participation in, 
its of, or be subjected to 
· any education program or 
~deral financial assistance 
this language must be read to 
ion in employment by educational 
financial assistance under Title 
E Title IX, and particularly of 
1ore lawyers--had been instructed 
.tion in employment, it cannot be 
~ section would have been written 
submit that no lawyer, asked to 
\ read the foregoing language alone, would think it had 
anything to do with the employment practices of schools. 
An employee of a school is not thought of as 
"participating in, or denied the benefits of" an 
"education program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance. nlO Moreover, regardless of the skills of the 
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages. 
13. 
draftsmen, the undisputed meaning of essentially identical 
I 
{ anti-discrimination language in Title VI should guide our 
interpretation of Title IX. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 710-711 (1979). But to reach a 
result it deems desirable, the Court puts common sense and 
precedent aside and undertakes an elaborate examination of 
an ambiguous legislative history to conclude that Congress 
/ 
has meant something it has not said. 
Title IX, there is no substantial legislative history that 
supports the Court's . t t t. 11 1n erpre a 1on. The most 
dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports 
of the responsible committees. Because Title IX is the 
result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of 
its meaning in reports from the relevant House and Senate 




10some employees might be beneficiarie of federally-
funded programs--e.g., grant programs for faculty 
research--but the Court's holding today not limited to 
discrimination against such employees. T e respondents 
who initiated these cases are two women se ing full time 
reemployment, and neither claims to be a par icipant in or 
to receive the benefits of a federal funded rogram except 
tangentially in that federal funds aid recipients in 
meeting general operating expenses. ~ 
11The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-
enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent 
Congresses. See ante, at The fact that, in 
1975, Congress considered-,- but failed to enact, 
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially 
irrelevant in determining the intent of the enacting 
Congress in 1972. Similarly, the fact that a subsequent 
Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting 
Title IX's coverage with respect to employment 
discrimination does not indicate that the 1972 Congress 
meant to include employment discrimination within Title 
IX. 
12It is true that the Conference Report noted that 
"the House receded" with regard to the deletion of that 
section of the House bill stating that no section of the 
1972 legislation applied to employment discrimination. S. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
----
14. 
Court is forced to rely almost exclusively on fragmentary 
statements by one supporter of the statute. we previously 
have emphasized that "[t]he remarks of a single 
legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in 
analyzing legislative history," Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 311 {1979), but the Court ignores this rule 
- -
~ ~he-court also disregards what a 
I 
reasonable legislative body would have intended. -There 
was no need to enact a third statute proscribing (""' ( 
employment discriminatiq__n in educational institutions on 
~x. Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were 
being amended to accomplish precisely that result. 
e, - ---
Moreover, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congresp would not have enacted 
'cJA._ wi4_. ~L~-n~~ .. L ~~-~'..L.d. 
~se inconsistent provision~ ~ n~~e t~=sam~gbi.em. -r~ 
~ ,, l 
Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute 
with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by 
the EEOC, federal court remedies available within certain 
time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, 
available unless the discriminatory conduct falls within 
one of several exceptions. See 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq. 
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast 
to Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund 
ter ination, B ap=tly A available at _the request of 
an A employee who ~iscriminat~ag~nat in 
employment in a federally funded program or activity. a~ 
Conf. Rep. No. 92-789, p. 221 {1972); H.R.Conf. Rep. 92-
1085, p. 221 {1972) {quoted ante, at ) • But, as 
discussed earlier in text, this evidence rs-as ambiguous 
as Senator Bayh's remarks. See supra at ____ __ 
-""""' 
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~~---------~ Specifically, the cutoff of funds would be at the 
expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, 
without remeding injustice to the employee. Title IX 
contains no provision for back pay or restoration of 
seniority rights. Indeed, it even fails to mandate 
employment or promotion to rectify discrimination. Title 
IX, by comparison with the other employment discrimination 
~ 
statutes, is deficient also in other respects: there are 
~ 
no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and 
no guidance as to procedure. The Solicitor General 
conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the 
two employees who initiated this suit was availale under 
Title VII. 13 See transcript of oral argument, 27. 
- - _ .. ___ joj ''i(•WM • ~ 
.!'awa rded" only at the expense of innocent 
the federally funded program. --I~ddi tion, under Title 
IX, there are no time limits, no onciliation provisions, 
-~~~- ._ 
and no remedies available that will ctually redress the 
/\ 
wrong suffered by an aggrieved 
Soliciter General conceded at oral 
is av ilable under Title VIr. 13 See 
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of 
Title IX to the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare .'9:-P- Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are 
administered by the 
~ most unlikely 
Department of Labor and EEOC. It 
that Congress would intend not only 
duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of 
s~~ferent departments of government 
1\ 
with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and 
\1~ / 
enforcement methods. v The District Court in Romeo v' 
Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 
1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (CA6) cert. den., 444 u.s. 972 
13An employee could presumably bring act ions against 
the school district under Title VII, Title IX, and the 
Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her wrong in the 
form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, 
request that funds be terminated. 
14 '±'-fl~  _t he Court's decision will result in needless 
duplication ~f governmental bureaucracy. Although HEW 
would prefer to have no involvement in employment 
discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, 
it will be required to maintain a staff of employees to 
enforce the anti-discrimination in employment portion of 
Title IX. And these employees will duplicate the large 
staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already 
devoted to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there 
will now be tw6 sets of federal regulations and regulators 
overseeing their employment practices. These different 
governmental departments may, or may not, have the same 
substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. 
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In sum, the Court's decisio~ is predicated 
on four assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to 
~ 
to include 
(i) ~Congress neglectf~ly or forgetfully fai~ 
wiZ/._~~ e4c.~.,~ 
famHi~r language in §90l.A that would have made 
Congress: 
clear its intent: (ii) Congress enacted a third statute ....... 
proscribing sex discrimination in employment in 
educational institutions in the absence of any showing of 
-~dc·~~~lW-0 ~) 
a need for~ ~-e ~~.0 : ~ (iii) that it failed to include 
in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial 
provisions relevant to employment discrimination: and (iv) 
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third 
statute in the Department of Education, a department 
whic~ even the Soliciter General concede~ lacks the 
2. 






(1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the 
EEOC, were established specifically for the 
purpose of regulating discrimination in 
employment practices. These agencies have the 
expertise and their enabling legislation has 
provided them with the investigative and 
enforcement machinery necessary to compel 
compliance with regulations against sex 
discrimination in employment. HEW does not have 
similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., 
at 1034. 
16. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the 
federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the 
Romeo Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only 1 imi ted 
expertise in employment matters. Its view is 
that employment cases are better resolved under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provides more appropriate remedies for such 
--...... ses." Brief, p. 37. 
~~~c~t's decision today is predicate 
~-t---wW<EWld _ bs.ue eee.g. able-t-o crtta"tfl~ (ii) Congress 
~ 
a statutef proscribing sex discrimination in 
A (, 
employment in educational institutions in the absence of 
LV 
a need for the third; and (H:-i.) finally, 
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute 
in the Department of Education, a department which, even 
' the Solici ter General concedes, lacks the experience and 
qualifications to oversee and enforce employment 
egislation. 
';0. L~) f-1.-.._;- --r .4o ~ ~ U<.-~ 
~--re~~~ 
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SUPREME COURT. U.S. 
PU _LJCFJ'n;~s U~" . 
·a? f4Pf1 1' '· ,, I 
North Haven Board 
Bell, et. al., 
Trumbull Board of 
of Education 
Education v. 
Dept. of Education & Potz 
POWELL, J., dissenting. 
v. 
u. s. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
u.s.c. §1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex in education programs and activities 
receiving federal funds. In 1975, the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated 
1As noted by the majority, ante at , n~', HEW's ~ 
duties under Title IX were transfered to tne-Depa~\ment of 
Education in 1979 by §301 (a) (3) of the Department of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 C.F.R. 
§106.5l(a) (1). Today, the Court upholds the validity of 
these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its 
legislative history, and several post-enactment events. 
Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither 
consistent with the statutory language nor supported by 
its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
I 
Although the majority begins with the language of 
the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its 
entirety only in the opening paragraphs of the opinion. 
In the section considering the statute's meaning, the 
Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the 
Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 678, 
20 u.s.c. §344~(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the 
majority in re r· g to both agencies as HEW since many of ~ 
the relevant ac s in this case took place before the 
reor~anization. See anteAat __ , n.\: j 
The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment 
events it discusses only 11 lend credence 11 to its 
interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 
3. 
rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at 
odds with the language used in the statute. Thus, 
according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's broad directive 
that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the basis 
of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as 
well as students." Ante, at This is not what the 
statutory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
" Education Amendments of 1972, §90l(a), 20 
u.s.c. §1681 (a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, 
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving 
federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by 
Congress to conclude that not only teachers and 
administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are 
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment, 
are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or 
activity3 : (ii) denied the benefits of a program or 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
activity: or (iii) subject to discrimination under an 
education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made no 
reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX, 
in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other 
statutes regulating employment practices. 4 
It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts 
of Appeals to consider the question before us has reached 
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by 
the statutory language. The issue was presented initially 
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro 
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), 
cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (1979), and that decision has 
been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider 
the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he 
language of section 901, 20 u.s.c. §1681, on its face, is 
aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies, i.e. , 
3 I agree with the majority that employees who 
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers 
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by 
Title IX. See ante:, at __ . 
4see, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
"): 29 u.s.c. §206 (d) (1) (Equal Pay Act: "[n]o employer 
having employees •... "). 
5. 
either students attending institutions receiving federal 
funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded 
by the United States government." The court went on to 
point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific 
exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate 
to students, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community 
Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S. 
972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on 
by this Court, noting that "as actually written, the 
statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are 
modified by later language which clearly limits their 
5The Court today not only finds this point 
un~c· ncing, but concludes that the "absence of a 
sp cif exclusion for employment among the list of 
ex ions tends to support the Court of Appeal's 
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante, 
at (citation omitted). I am unable to follow this 
reasoning. The absence of employment-related except ions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within 
the scope of the statute. But I fail to see how that 
absence affirmatively indicates that the statute was 
intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did 
intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not 
provide exceptions similar to those in Title VII. For 
example, Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority 
plans, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment 
of Indians at establishments operating on reservations, 42 
u.s.c. §2000e-2(i). 
6. 
meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The court concluded that 
the statute "reaches only those types of disparate 
treatment" that involve discrimination against program 
beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
6The question has also been presented to the 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 
972 (1972) the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit 
cons ide red HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro. 
And in Seattle University A_v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9 
1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. 
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier 
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had 
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support 
HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the 
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more 
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School 
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert. pending 
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023. 
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund 
termination to the offending program or activity. In 
reaching this decision, the court noted that program-
specific regulations might be sustainable in some 
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay 
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative 
to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. The 
court noted that an argument can be made that in such a 
case, the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or 
"subject to discrimination under" the federal program. 
622 F.2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would 
agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of 
discriminatory employment practices with respect to all 
types of employees, i.e., secretaries and administrators 
as well as teachers. 
7. 
A 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of 
Title IX "does not expressly include • employees." 
But it finds a strong negative inference in the fact that 
§901 does not "exclude employees from its scope". Ante, 
at The Court then turns to the "legislative history 
for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to 
prohibit employment discrimination". Ibid. I agree with 
the several Courts of Appeals that have concluded 
unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be 
read to proscribe employee discrimination.AOnly rarely may 
legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute 
language that Congress itself did not include. To justify 
such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must 
show clearly and unequivocally that Congress did intend 
what it failed to state. 7 The Court's elaborate 
exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of 
7 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. 
Volpe, 410 u.s. 402, 412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this 
ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we 




Title IX was a floor amendment sponsored by 
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). The amendment closed loopholes in earlier civil 
rights legislation; three problem areas had been 
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 
1970. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on 
Section 805 of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee 
on Education of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) • Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion, or national origin, did not apply to 
discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals 
to perform work connected with the educational activities 
of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, title 
VII, §702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
u.s.c. §206(d) (1), but it did not apply to administrative, 
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. 
~ See 
lY 
29 §213(a) (1970) (no longer in force) . 
9. 
Finally, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
u.s.c. §2000d, barred discrimination on the basis of 
"race, color, or national origin," but not sex, in any 
federally funded programs and activities. 
The Bayh floor amendment, Arnendmen t No. 8 7 4, 
was introduced in 19 72, 118 Cong. Rec. 580 3 (19 72) (print 
of amendment), to close these loopholes. In §§ 1001-1003 
of the Arnendent, a new Title IX was created, banning 
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded 
educational programs and activities, thus effectively 
extending Title VI's prohibition to sex discrimination in 
federally funded programs. Section 1005 of that amendment 
amended Title VII to cover employment discrimination in 
educational institutions. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1010 amended 
the Equal Pay Act so that di scr iminat ion in pay on the 
basis of sex was barred, even for teachers and other 
professionals. Ibid. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in 
educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 
1001-1003 of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such 
10. 
discrimination. Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, 
as its language clearly indicates, to bar discrimination 
against beneficiaries of federally funded programs and 
activities. This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed 
by the fact that it was modelled after Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 Title VI was limited in its 
scope to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally 
funded programs, not general employment practices of fund 
recipients. 4 2 U • S • C • § 2 0 0 Od- 3 • 9 And, as this Court 
noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 
770-711 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected 
the new provision to be interpreted consistently with 
Title VI, which had been its model. 
B 
8The opertive language in the two provisions is 
virtually identical. Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d (Title VI) 
with 20 U.S .C. §l68la (Title IX) . 
942 u.s.c. §2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall 
be construed to authorize action under this 
subchapter by any department or agency with 
respect to any department or agency or labor 
organization except where a primary objective of 
the Federal financial assistance is to provide 
employment." 
11. 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to 
the proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. 
First, it notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, 
not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title 
IX." Ante, at (citing Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710-711 (1979). This point begs 
the question, however, since there is no evidence that in 
1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress thought Title VI 
applied to employment discrimination. A The second reason 
advanced by the Court for disregarding Title VI is that 
it, unlike Title IX, includes a section, i.e. §604, 42 
u.s.c. §2000d-3, exressly stating that Title VI applies 
only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to 
employment discrimination per se. But in an earlier 
version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, 
Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, 
but the reason for this approach was strategic, not 
substantive. Supporters feared that if Title VI were 
opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on 
12. 
the floor of the Congress. Sex Discrimination 
Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary 
Education and Labor, House of Representatives--Review of 
regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and 
IX, the Court stresses that the House version of the 
Senate's Bayh Amendment originally contained a provision, 
§1004, equivalent to §604 of Title VI, explicitly stating 
that no section of the 1972 legislation applied to 
discrimination in employment, but this provision 
was ~1J. 
eliminated by the Conference. Ante, at __ • A A strong 
argument, however, can be made that there was a non-
substantive reason for eliminating §1004 from the House 
bill. In 197 5 hearings before the House Subcommittee on 
Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, 
Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the 
background of Title IX to a witness, noted that this 
change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the 
13. 
Sube on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives--Review of regulations to implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without 
reference to Senator O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House 
bill and the Senate's Bayh Amendment, §1004 of the House 
bill was a drafting mistake~ it stated that no section of 
the House bill applied to employment, though sections of 
the House Bill, as well as the Senate version, contained 
express changes to the employment diescrimination 
provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Since the 
analogous provision of Title VI, §604, had been regarded 
as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is on weak ground in 
arguing that the Conference Report's use of the 
ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a 
substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an 
obvious drafting error at a very late stage in the 
legislative process. 
10see, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement 
of Attorney General Kennedy)~ Civil Rights: Hearings on 
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman Celler, 






In concluding that the legislative history 
indicates Title IX was intended to extend to employment 
discrimination, the Court is forced to rely primarily on 
the statements of a single senator •11 The first 
statement, ante" at (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 
(1972)), ~ is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did state that 
faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after 
mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any 
mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.~~ 
Immediately thereafter, however, he~ stated that Title 
IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title VI. Yet 
Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) 
he regarded "sections 10 01-100 5" as " [ c] entr al to [his] 
amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment 
covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. 
11The most dependable sources of legislative intent 
are the reports of the responsible committees. Because 
Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no 
explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
15. 
Ante~at ___ (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, 
§1005 of the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title 
VII and thus §§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination 
regardless of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the 
Court uses an elipsis rather than include the following 
words from the second Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of 
federally assisted programs and activities is 
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition 
does , not apply to discrimination on the basis of 
sex. In order to close this loophole, my 
? 
amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement 
provisions which generally parallel the 
provisions of title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 ? r--l--,----(-l-97_2_)_(_i_n, 1pse ante~at __ ) · f 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that 
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title 
VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante ~at ___ (quoting ~ 
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to 
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the 
Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers 
to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First 
12see description of various sections of the Bayh 
Amendment, supra"at ___ • See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 
(1972) (print of amendment). 
Circuit noted in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy~ ... ~ as 
well as the discussion immediately precedin~ and 
following the above-quoted passage, indicates 
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into 
three sections, two of which were specifically 
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the 
third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed 
to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s 
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We 
think this particularly in light of the fact 
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not 
as prescise as a response in written form, ...• " 
59 3 F. 2d, at 4 2 7. 
16. 
Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair 
to say that the legislative history accords with the 
natural reading of the statute. J( Title IX prohibits 
discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally 
funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX 
is modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so 
limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can 
be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 
13The Court devotes considerable time to describing ft! 
post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of ~ 
subsequent Congresses. See ante, at ~/ . The fact ~ 
that, in 1975, Congress cons1dered, but flrred to enact, 
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially 
irrelevant in determining the intent of the enacting 
Congress in 1972. Similarly, the fact that a subsequent 
Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting 
Title IX's coverage with respect to employment 
discrimination does not indicate that the 1972 Congress 
meant to include employment discrimination within Title 
Footnote continued on next page. 
17. 
As indicated above, when critical words, in this 
case "employment discrimination," are absent from a 
statute and its meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on 
legislative history to add omitted words is rarely 
appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear 
and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should 
a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. 
And, however else one might describe the legislative 
history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither 
clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of 
§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
" §901 (a). 




support for its position in this language, it must look to 
the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not 
§901 was meant to prohibit employment discrimination". 
Ante, at Although the Court examines at length the 
truncated legislative history, it ignores other factors 
highly relevant to intent: (i} whether the ambiguity 
easily could have been avoided by the legislative 
draftsman; ( i i} whether Congress had prior experience and 
a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect 
to this particular subject; and (iii} whether existing 
legislation clearly and adequately proscribed and remedied 
the conduct in question. When these factors are 
considered, there is no reason to read sex employment 
discrimination language into §901. 
If there had been such an intent, no legislative 
draftsman--even one of modest accomplishments--would have 
written §901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have 
been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination 
language in Title VI I and the Equal Pay Act, language 
specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although 
these other statutes had been J\enacted by an earlier 
19. 
Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and 
considered, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were also 
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination 
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. 
Congress would hardly have enacted a third statute 
addressing this problem, but, in contrast to the other 
two, use language ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of 
Title VII and Title IX suggests that Congress would not 
have enacted the inconsistent provisions of of the latter 
with respect to remedies and procedures. Title VII is a 
comprehensive anti-discrimination statute with carefully 
prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, 
federal court remedies available within certain time 
limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to 
make whole the victims of illegal discrimination and 
available unless discriminatory conduct falls within one 
This of several exceptions.~ee 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq. 
thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to 
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund 
termination, apparently now available at the request of 
20. 
any female employee who can prove discrimination in 
employment in a federally funded program or activity. 
This cutoff of funds, at the expense of innocent 
beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the 
injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not 
authorize a single action, such as employment, 
reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment 
discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no 
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no 
guidance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 u.s.c. §1681 et 
seq. (Title IX) with 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq. (Title VII). 
The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that 
appropriate relief for the two employees who initiated 
this suit was availale under Title VII. 15 See transcript 
14It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress 
itself provided for administrative procedures to redress 
employment discrimination in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in 
Title IX, see 20 u.s.c. §1681 et seq. Such administrative 
procedures as are available under Title IX are part of 
/ 
theregulations promulgated by HEW, 45 C.F.R. §§80.7-80.10. 
~Gl .the administrative procedures enacted by 
~ ~?~~ress. in~the U.S.C and by HEW in the C.F.R. are q~, 
different, though addressing a single problem. The~ 
regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 
80.9-80.11. In Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator _...._......, 
attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, as 
counsel for the victims of d1scrimination in subsequent de 
novo judicial proceedings. See 42 u.s.c. §2000e, et seq~ 
Footnote(s) 15 will appear on following pages. 
it so 
J.e.A .j re. s...~ 
// 
21. 
of ~ral ~rgument, 27. A Finally, Congress delegated the 
administration of Title IX to the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
are administered by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It 
is most unlikely that Congress would intend not only 
/ 
duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of 
these provisions by different departments of government 
with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and 
enforcement methods. 16 The District Court in Romeo 
Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 
19 7 7) , a f f ' d 6 0 0 F • 2d 5 81 ( CA 6 ) c e r t . den • , 4 4 4 U . S . 9 7 2 
(1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the 
15An employee could presumably bring actions against 
the school district under Title VII, ' Title IX, and the 
Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her wrong in the 
form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, 
requ!gt that funds be terminated. 
The Court's decision will result in needless 
duplication of governmental bureaucracy. Although HEW 
would prefer to have no involvement in employment 
discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, 
it will be required to maintain a staff of employees to 
enforce the anti-discrimination in employment portion of 
Title IX. And these employees will duplicate the large 
staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already 
devoted to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there 
will now be two sets of federal regulations and regulators 
overseeing their employment practices. These different 
governmental departments may, or may not, have the same 
substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in 
the event of non-compliance are quite different. See 
discussion in text supra, at 
EEOC, were established specifically for the 
purpose of regulating discrimination in 
employment practices. These agencies have the 
expertise and their enabling legislation has 
provided them with the investigative and 
enforcement machinery necessary to compel 
compliance with regulations against sex 
discrimination in employment. HEW does not have 
similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., 
at 1034. 
22. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the 
federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the 
Romeo Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited 
expertise in employment matters. Its view is 
that employment cases are better resolved under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provides more appropriate remedies for such 
cases." Brief, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an 
unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is 
predicated on four assumptions that I am unwilling to 
impute that body: (i) that Congress neglectfuly or 
forgetfully failed to include language in §901 with 
respect to discrimination that would have made clear its 
intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute 
proscribing sex discrimination in employment in 
educational institutions in the absence of any showing of 
a need for such duplicative legislation; and (iii) that 
23. 
Congress failed to include in the third statute 
appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to 
employment discrimination; and (iv) finally, that it 
vested the authority to enforce the third statute in HEW, 
a department which even the Solici ter General concedes 
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and 
enforce employment legislation. 
lfp/ss 05/11/82 Rider A, footnote (North Haven) 
NORTHFN SALLY-POW 
Possibly add a footnote along the following lines at the 
point you suggest, Mary: 
'"' 
The Court puts aside Senator Bayh's statement 
that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing the 
~-le 
statement as "inadvertent". This hardly gives one 
1\ 
confidence that the Senator's statements selectively 
relied upon by the Court are not also inadvertent. As the 
Court's decision concededly is based solely on the floor 
debate, we note again--as evidence of how little it 
actually supports the Court--that the views of Courts of 
Appeals judges with respect to this debate have ranged 
' . 
from viewing it as indicating no intention to read 
employment discrimination into Title IX to recognizing 
that--like most floor debates--the oral statements of 
Senators even if not ambiguous must be viewed with 
skepticism. ( ~k ~ )' 
2. 
lfp/ss 05/11/82 Rider A, p. 15 (North Haven) 
NORTH15 SALLY-POW 
Add in text/ of our opinion: 
Responding to this dissent, see third paragraph 
of fn. 26, ante at 24, the Court states that the factors 
~ 
considered in Part III of my opinion (at 11-15) , and 
~ 
summarized above,"are not relevant" to "ascertaining 
legislative intent". If this were a "plain language" 
case, perhaps this statement could be made. But the Court 
recognizes that its position cannot be sustained by the 
plain language, and therefore it relies exclusively on 
ambiguous and muddled oral statements made in Senate 
~ ~ ~ .. ~<.~~) ;_;r 
~~ 
2. 
reasonable legislators surely would consider. After all, 
under settled rules of statutory construction legislation 
!¥; 
bodies are presumed to act reasonably. (cite cases) • 
17 The insistence of the Court ,_ 
considerations are "irrelevant", and that 
look at the brief and ambiguous legislati e 
all the more remarkable in light e views of other 
federal judges. As noted abov , of the six Courts of 
Appeals to consider wheth r Title 
discrimination, only the Court of Appeals for the Se 
/ 
/ 
Circuit in thi / case agrees with this Court. 
judges on Courts of Appeals read the 
banning employment discrimination. 
~ 
vi w. But~on the Court's assumption of 




eyes to the legislative 
'i,:~ .. t' 
. . 
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SUPREME COUR~ F E UNITED STATES 
No. 80-986 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal 
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund 
recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court up-
holds the validity of these regulations, relying on the statu-
tory language, its legislative history, and several post-enact-
ment events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is 
neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported 
by its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
I 
Although the majority begins with the language of the 
' As noted by the ~eat-, n. 4, HEW's ~ ~ 
IX were transferee! to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(av)(3) 
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed. , Supp. IV). I follow the~ · 
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in t is 
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at -, n. 4. 
2 The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses 
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at - . 
80-986-DISSENT 
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statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in 
the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section con-
sidering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words 
of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting 
an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in 
the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's 
broad directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against 
on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employ-
ees as well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what 
the statutory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972, 
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's ~ ~ 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or~ • 
the beneficiaries i!J programs or activities receiving federal ~ Jdc_,_ 
nding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to ~/-s J o-f-
conclude that not only teachers and administrators, but also 
secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated against on the 
basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participa-
tion in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the benefits of a 
program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an 
education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made 
no reference whatever to employers or employees in Title 
IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other stat-
utes regulating employment practices. 4 
3 I agree with the majority that employees who directly participate in a 
federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, 
protected by Title IX. See ante, at-. -1 
' See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
~~ ... ~~ 
~hfy~~~ 
~~~~ 
~~I~ C~2- btA-~~ 
~~.~~~- ~~--~~ 
,9 ~,Lt$) ~~--~~~~~ 
80-986----DISSENT 
}~~~) 
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~~ 
It is noteworthy that ot one of th{s* Courts of Appeals 
to consider the question before us ~achedtfie conclusiOn 
that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory lan-
guage. The issue was presented initially to the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v. 
Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 
972 (1979), and that decision has been followed by most other 
Courts of Appeals to consider the question. There, the 
court concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of 
the federal monies, i. e., either students attending institu-
tions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special 
research being funded by the United States government." 
The court went on to point out that this reading of "the plain 
language of the statute is buttressed by an examination of the 
specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which re-
late to students, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools 
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit_fejected the 
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not-
ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so 
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal 
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees . . . . "). 
5 The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes 
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX 
does protect employees." Ante, at- (citation omitted). I am unable 
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the 
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did in-
tend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions 
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe 
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), ot•-tn:efQrQntial emplo;= 
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broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language 
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The 
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of 
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against pro-
gram beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
A 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX 
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a 
• The question~been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the 
, Fifth, Eighth, a~d Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. 
Louts v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1972) the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's argu-
ments but "adopted" the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in 
Isleslboro. And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993 (CA9 
1980), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 
449 U. S. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed the three earlier circUit decisions, noting that each of those courts 
had held that the plain language of Title IX did not support HEW's posi-
tion. Even in the decision below, in which the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit upheld the regulations, the court did not base its decision on 
the statutory language, ~ statectffi'lrt" the "language is more ambiguous 
than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, 
No. 80--1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the of-
fending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted 
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, 
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid 
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal 
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, 
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination 
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indi-
cation it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory em-
ployment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. eJ secretaries 
and administrators as well as teachers. 
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "ex-
clude employees from its scope". Ante, at--. The Court 
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to 
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination". Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory 
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee 
discrimination. Only rarely may legislativ · be relied 
upon to read into a statute language that Congress itself d1d 
not include. To justify sue a reading of a statute, the legis-
lative history must show clearly and unequivocally that Con-
gress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The Court's elabo-
rate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of this 
standard. 
Title IX was a floor amendment sponsored by Senator 
Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The 
amen men losef loopholes in earlier civil rights legislation; 
three problem areas had been identified in hearings by a spe-
cial House Committee in 1970. See Discrimination Against 
Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the 
Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, 
or national origin, did not apply to discrimination "with re-
spect to employment of individuals to perform work con-
nected with the educational activities of [educational] institu-
tions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. 
And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 banned discrimination in 
wages on the basis of sex, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), but it did 
not apply to administrative, executive, or professional work-
ers, including teachers. See 29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no 
7 See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U. S. 402, 
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is 
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the 
legislative intent."). 
I 
lfp/ss 04/19/82 Rider A, p. 6 (North Haven) 
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The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 
1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed 
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover 
employment discrimination in educational institutions. 
Ibid. Sections 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even 
for teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And ~§ 1001-
1010 created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the 
basis of sex in federally funded educational programs and 
activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's 
prohibition to sex discrimination in such programs. 
---
6 
longer in force). Fin y, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2 OOd, barred discrimination on the basis 
of "race, color, or n tional origin," but not sex, in any feder-
ally funded progra s and activities. 
The Bayh floor mendment, Amendment No. 874, ~ 
troduced in 1972, 18 Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amend- ) /!A:..;~ 
L ~ ment , close these loopholes. ~ § 10 ~00 
h IM ~~Ameaec;n~~._a new Title IX w.as ePeatet\_ banm~ discrimina- . , ..J- ~_./ 
~ -=- tion on th~ basis of sex in federally funded educational pro- j ~
grams and activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's 
"'- prohibition to sex discrimination in federally funded pro-
'-------- _ grams. Section 005 of that amendment amended Title VII ) 
to cover em loyment discrimination in· educational institu-
S.u., ......... ,~..,tions. Ibid. A-Rd §§ 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act 
- --- so that discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, 
even for teachers and other professionals. Ibid. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination. 
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language 
- - -. clearly indicates to bar discrimination against beneficiaries 
of federally funded rograms and activities. This interpre-
tation of Title IX 1s confirmed by the fact that it was mod-
elled after Title VI of tfie Gtvil &igfits Act of 19W Title VI~ 
~ was limited in its scope to discrimination against beneficiaries ~ 
of federally funded programs, not general employment prac-
~ nd recipients. "\ 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3. 9 And, as 
8 The opertive language in the two provisions is virtually identical. 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX). 
9 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
tion under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to 
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary 
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 
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this Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it 
expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently 
with Title VI, which had been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the 
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it 
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, 
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however, 
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title 
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment 
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court 
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a 
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, exressly stating 
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund bene-
ficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an 
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title 
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the 
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. 
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amend-
ment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the 
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to imple-
ment Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the 
Court stresses that the House version of w Senate's Bayh 
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equiva-
lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of 
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, 
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, 
8<J-986-DISSENT 
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at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that 
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004 
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while ex-
plaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that 
this change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title 
------. IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without refer-
ence to O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is clear 
that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and the 
Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a 
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill 
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as 
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the 
employment diescrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is 
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use 
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a sub-
stantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious 
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX 
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the 
Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single 
10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. 
on Rules, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman 
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI). 
· 80-986-DISSENT 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL 9 
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did 
state that faculty employment would be covered by his 
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX 
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated 
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title 
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he re-
garded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers 
discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 
- (quoting 118 Gong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of 
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and 
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regard-
less of whether Title IX does.'2 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the sec-
ond Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally as-
sisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amend-
ment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 
Gong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he 
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI 
11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the 
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amend-
ment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
12 See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at 
-. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment). 
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a 
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court 
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title 
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted 
in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the 
discussion immediately preceding and following the 
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh di-
vided his analysis into three sections, two of which were 
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), 
the third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be 
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think 
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly 
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and 
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . . " 
593 F. 2d, at 427. 
Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair to say that 
the legislative history accords with the natural reading of the 
statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against bene-
ficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all 
employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds. 
Title IX is modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so lim-
ited-and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be 
read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em-
'
3 The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment ac-
tions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at -
- -. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to enact, 
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant in 
determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the 
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limit-
ing Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not 
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
80-986---DISSENT 
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ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its 
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to 
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legisla-
tive history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to con-
gressional intent should a court presume to add what Con-
gress failed to include. And, however else one might 
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court to-
day, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of 
=> Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance .... " § 901(a). 
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support 
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legisla-
tive history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was 
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at 
--. Although the Court examines at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant t~  
intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have been 
avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Congress 
had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in leg-
islating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii) 
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately pro-
scribed and remedied the conduct in question. When these 
factors are considered, there is no sex e 
ment discrimination language into § 901. 
If there had been such an intent, no legislative drafts-
man-even one of modest accomplishments-would have 
-~ written § 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have 
tion within Title IX. 
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been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination 
language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language spe-
cifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these 
other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at 
the time Title IX was being drafted and considerecki!'itle VII _.--
and the Equal Pay Act were also amended to proscribe ex- 0 
plicitly employment discrimination in educational institutions 
on the basis of sex. Congress8hardl~have enacted a 
third statute addressing this problem, but, in contrast to the 
other two, use language ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the 
inconsistent provisions of of the latter with respect to reme-
dies and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-
discrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures 
for conciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies avail-
able within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of 
relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimi-
nation and available unless discriminatory conduct falls 
within one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et 
seq. This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp con- ~ 
trast to Title IX, wftie~ta1ns oruy one ext reme remedy, 
fund termination, apparently now available at the request of 
any female employee who can prove discrimination in em-
ployment in a federally funded program or activity. This 
cutoff of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the 
funded program, will not remedy the injustice to the em-
ployee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, 
such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify 
employment discrimination.· And Title IX, unlike Title VII, 
has no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and 
no guidance as to procedure. 1~ Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 
" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII , 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. , it enacted no comparable provisions in Title 
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et seq. (Title IX) with 42 U. S.C. §2000e et seq. (Title VII). 
The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appro-
priate relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was 
___ ..:;:a..:..va, ilale under Title VII. 15 See transcript of oral argument, 
27. ) Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title 
IX to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.,(" 
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered by the De-
partment of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely that Con-
gress would intend not only duplicate substantive legislation 
but also enforcement of these provisions by different depart-
ments of government with different enforcement powers, 
areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The District 
7 
• 
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are 
available under Title IX are part of th~egulations promulgated by HEW, 
45 CFR §§ 80.7--80.10. r 
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and 
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single prob-
lem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§80.9--80.11. In 
Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment 
disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimina-
tion in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, 
et seq. 
15 An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district 
under Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or 
her wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, 
request that funds be terminated. 
16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental 
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in em-
ployment discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, it will be 
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination 
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate 
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted 
to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two 
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment 
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, 
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event 
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Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 
1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6) cert. den., 
444 U. 8. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, 
were established specifically for the purpose of regulat-
ing discrimination in employment practices. These 
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legisla-
tion has provided them with the investigative and en-
forcement machinery necessary to compel compliance 
with regulations against sex discrimination in employ-
ment. HEW does not have similar enforcement author-
ity." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the fed-
eral respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo 
Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited exper-
tise in employment matters. Its view is that employ-
ment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropri-
ate remedies for such cases." Brief, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu-
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on four as-
sumptions that I am unwilling to impute " hat body: W.--;-;th-a7t __ _ 
Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed to include language 
in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have made 
clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute pro-
scribing sex discrimination in employment in educational in-
stitutions in the absence of any showing of need for such 
duplicative legislation; m t a ongress failed to inc u e 
in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial pro-
visions relevant to employment discrimination; and (iv) fi-
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nally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute 
in HEW, a department wftieflf ven tne '"So1Iciter "General con-
cedes lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee 
and enforce employment legislation. 
'· 
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SUPREME COUR~ F E UNITED STATES 
No. 80-986 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education ·Amendments of 1972, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal 
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund re-
cipients. 34 CFR § 106.5l(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds 
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory lan-
guage, its legislative history, and several post-enactment 
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is nei-
ther consistent with the statutory language nor supported by 
its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
I 
Although the ~~ns with the language of the 
' As noted by the Court, ante, at -, n. 4, HEW's duties under Title 
IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3) 
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the ~Yin 
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this 
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at-, n. 4. 
2 The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses 
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statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in 
the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section con-
sidering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words 
of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting 
an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in 
the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 901's 
broad directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against 
on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employ-
ees as well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what 
the statutory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972, 
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or 
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiv-
ing federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Con-
gress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, 
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) de-
nied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the 
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimina-
tion under an education program or activity. Moreover, 
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em-
,~~~ ~ 
3 I agree with th!iful,ajgrity. that employees who directly participate in a 
federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, 
protected by Title IX. See ante, at-. Respondents Elaine Dove and J 
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any 
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher 
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in 
employment. 
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict lan-
guage in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4 
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five Courts of 
Appeals to consider the question before us'""J,a.4rreached the 
conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the 
statutory language. The issue was presented initially to the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School 
Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), cert. de-
nied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), and that decision has been fol-
lowed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider the ques-
tion. There, the court concluded that "[t]he language of 
section 901, 20 U. S. C. § 1681, on its face, is aimed at the 
beneficiaries of the federal monies, i. e., either students at-
tending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers en-
gaged in special research being funded by the United States 
government." The court went on to point out that this read-
ing of "the plain language of the statute is buttressed by an 
examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the stat-
ute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools 
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also re-
jected the interpretation of the statute now relied on by this 
' See, e. g. , 42 U.S. C. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal 
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees . ... "). 
6 The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes 
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX 
does protect employees." Ante, at- (citation omitted). I am unable 
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the 
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did in-
tend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions 
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe 
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 
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Court, noting that "as actually written, the statute is not 
nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later 
language which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 
584. The court concluded that the statute "reaches only 
those types of disparate treatment" that involve discrimina-
tion against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
A 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX 
6 The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the 
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but 
"adopted" the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in lslesl-
boro. And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993 (CA9 1980), 
cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 
U. S. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed 
the three earlier circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had held 
that the plain language of Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even 
in the decision below, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
upheld the regulations, the court did not base its decision on the statutory 
language, and stated that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW 
suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, 
No. 80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the of-
fending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted 
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, 
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid 
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal 
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, 
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination 
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indi-
cation it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory em-
ployment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly em-
ployees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers. 
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"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a 
strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "ex-
clude employees from its scope". Ante, at--. The Court 
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to 
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination". Ibid. I agree with~ several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that-the statutory 
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee 
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied 
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress 
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, 
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously 
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The 
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far 
short of this standard. 
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by 
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in 
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been 
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not 
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of indi-
viduals to perform work connected with the educational ac-
tivities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
7 See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U. S. 402, 
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is 
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the 
legislative intent."). 
P1Z 
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banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative, 
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national 
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and 
activities. 
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed these 
loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover employ-
ment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. Sec-
tions 1009--1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that discrimi-
nation in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for 
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003 
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, 
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex 
discrimination in such programs. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination. 
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language 
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries 
of federally funded educational programs and activities. 
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it 
was modelled after Title VI, a statute Wb limited in its scope 
to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded 
programs, not general employment practices of fund recipi-
ents. 8 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 77~711 
• The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical. 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX). 
9 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
8(}-.986--DISSENT 
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(1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new 
provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which 
had been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the 
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it 
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, 
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however, 
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title 
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment 
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court 
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a 
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating 
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund bene-
ficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an 
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title 
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the 
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. 
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amend-
ment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the 
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to imple-
ment Title IX, 94th Gong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the 
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh 
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equiva-
tion under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to 
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary 
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 
. '· 
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of 
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, 
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, 
at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that 
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004 
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while ex-
plaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that 
this change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without refer-
ence to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and 
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a 
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill 
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as 
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the 
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is 
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use 
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a sub-
stantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious 
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX 
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the 
10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. 
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman 
Geller, House Floor Manager of Title VI) . 
80-986---DISSENT 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL 9 
Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single 
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did 
state that faculty employment would be covered by his 
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX 
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated 
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title 
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he re-
garded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers dis-
crimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 
- (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of 
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and 
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regard-
less of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the sec-
ond Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally as-
sisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amend-
ment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he 
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI 
11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the 
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amend-
ment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
'
2 See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at 
-. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment). 
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a 
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court 
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title 
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted 
in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the 
discussion immediately preceding and following the 
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh di-
vided his analysis into three sections, two of which were 
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), 
the third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be 
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think 
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly 
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and 
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . . " 
593 F. 2d, at 42~ 
Rather than support(the Court's view,~ 
the legislative historyaccords with the natural reading of the 
statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against bene-
ficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all 
employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds. 
Title IX is modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so lim-
ited-and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be 
read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em-
13 The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment ac-
tions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at-
- -. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to enact, 
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant in 
determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the 
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limit-
ing Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not 
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
80--986-DISSENT 
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ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its 
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to 
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legisla-
tive history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to con-
gressional intent should a court presume to add what Con-
gress failed to include. And, however else one might 
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court to-
day, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of 
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance .... " § 901(a). 
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support 
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legisla-
tive history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was 
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at 
--. Although the Court examines at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to 
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could 
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether 
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of ex-
pertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; 
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately 
proscribed and e con uc m question. en 
these factors ar considered, there is no justification for read-
ing sex employment discrimination langua~g~e~i~n~to~§j29~0~1.:---::-..l-~~c:..:---
If there had been such an intent, no egJ.slative drafts-
~r--------. 
rna · would have 
written § 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have 
tion within Title IX. 
; -
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been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination 
language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language spe-
cifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these 
other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at 
the time Title IX was being drafted and considere . 1t e 
VII and the Equal Pay Acili:er@ amended to proscribe 
explicitly employment discrimination in educational institu-
tions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly would have en-
acted a third statute addressing this problem, but, in con-
trast to the other two, use language ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the 
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedi 
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discri' 
nation statute with carefully prescribed procedures for 
ciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies ava11 ... 
within certain time limits, and certain specified for 
lief, designed to make whole the victims of i iscrtmma-
tion and available unless discrimin conduct falls within 
one of several exceptions. e 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
c ured approach is in sharp contrast to 
Title I , whic contains only one extreme remedy, fund ter-
minat arently now available at the request of any fe-
male employee who can prove discrimination in employment 
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of 
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded 
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. In-
deed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as em-
ployment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employ-
ment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no 
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guid-
ance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. 
" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII , 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title 
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(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The 
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate 
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was avail-
able under Title VII. 15 See Transcript of Oral Argument, 27. 
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX 
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 
contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered 
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely 
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive 
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by differ-
ent departments of government with different enforcement 
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The 
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are 
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW, 
45 CFR §§ 80.7-80.10. 
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and 
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single prob-
lem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In 
Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment 
disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimina-
tion in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, 
et seq. 
15 An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district J 
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her 
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, re-
quest that funds be terminated under Title IX. 
16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental 
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in em-
ployment discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, it will be 
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination 
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate 
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted 
to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two 
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment 
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, 
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event 
s I ,.,~4-
clo r-i 0c.o. ~ i Ot\ 
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District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6) 
cert. den., 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, 
were established specifically for the purpose of regulat-
ing discrimination in employment practices. These 
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legisla-
tion has provided them with the investigative and en-
forcement machinery necessary to compel compliance 
with regulations against sex discrimination in employ-
ment. HEW does not have similar enforcement author-
ity." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the fed-
eral respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo 
Court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited exper-
tise in employment matters. Its view is that employ-
ment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropri-
ate remedies for such cases." Brief, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu- / 
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated~ 
ceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) 
that Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed to include lan-
guage in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have 
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third stat-
ute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions in the absence of any showin of a need for 
such duplicative legislation; n m a ongress ailed to 
include in the third statute appropriate procedural and reme-
dial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) 
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra, 
at-. 
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POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal 
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund re-
cipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(1). Today, the Court upholds 
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory lan-
guage, its legislative history, and several post-enactment 
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is nei-
ther consistent with the statutory language nor supported by 
its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
I 
Although the Court begins with the language of the stat-
'As noted by the Court, ante, at -, n. 4, HEW's duties under Title 
IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3) 
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in 
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this 
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at -, n. 4. 
~ The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses 
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at-. 
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ute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the 
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section consider-
ing the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the 
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an in-
terpretation actually at odds with the language used in the 
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "(s]ection 901's broad 
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the 
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as 
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the stat-
utory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972, 
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or 
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiv-
ing federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Con-
gress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, 
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) de-
nied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the 
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimina-
tion under an education program or activity. Moreover, 
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em-
a I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a fed-
eral program, i. e. , teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, 
protected by Title IX. See ante, at-. Respondents Elaine Dove and 
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any 
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher 
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict lan-
guage in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4 
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of ap-
peals to consider the question before us reached the conclu-
sion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory 
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee 
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other 
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court 
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal 
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving 
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being 
funded by the United States government." The court went 
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific ex-
emptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to stu-
dents, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools 
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the 
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not-
'See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal 
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees .... "). 
5 The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes 
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX 
does protect employees." Ante, at- (citation omitted). I am unable 
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the 
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did in-
tend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions 
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe 
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 
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ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so 
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language 
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The 
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of 
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against pro-
gram beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
A 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX 
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a 
6 The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro. And in 
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom. 
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit decisions, 
noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of Title IX 
did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, the court 
did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated that the 
"language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, 
No. 80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the 
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the of-
fending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted 
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, 
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid 
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal 
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, 
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination 
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indi-
cation it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory em-
ployment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly em-
ployees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers. 
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "ex-
clude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court 
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to 
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination." Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory 
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee 
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied 
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress 
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, 
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously 
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The 
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far 
short of this standard. 
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by 
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in 
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been 
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not 
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of indi-
viduals to perform work connected with the educational ac-
tivities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88--352, 
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative, 
' See, e. g. , Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402, 
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is 
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the 
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executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national 
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and 
activities. 
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 
118 Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed 
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover 
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. 
Sections 100~1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for 
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003 
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, 
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex 
discrimination in such programs. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination. 
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language 
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries 
of federally funded educational programs and activities. 
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it 
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to 
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded pro-
grams, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8 
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon 
"The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical. 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX). 
9 42U. S.C. §2000d-3states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
tion under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to 
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary 
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v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979), 
when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provi-
sion to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had 
been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the 
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it 
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, 
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however, 
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title 
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment 
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court 
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a 
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating 
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund bene-
ficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an 
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title 
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the 
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. 
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amend-
ment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the 
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
House of Representatives--Review of regulations to imple-
ment Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the 
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh 
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equiva-
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. " 
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of 
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, 
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, 
at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that 
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004 
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while ex-
plaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that 
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without refer-
ence to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and 
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a 
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill 
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as 
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the 
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is 
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use 
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a sub-
stantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious 
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX 
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the 
10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. 
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman 
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI). 
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Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single 
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did 
state that faculty employment would be covered by his 
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX 
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated 
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title 
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he re-
garded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers dis-
crimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 
- (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of 
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and 
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regard-
less of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an 
elipsis rather than include the following words from the sec-
ond Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally as-
sisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amend-
ment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he 
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI 
11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the 
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amend-
ment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
12 See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at 
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a 
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court 
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title 
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted 
in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the 
discussion immediately preceding and following the 
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh di-
vided his analysis into three sections, two of which were 
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), 
the third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be 
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think 
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly 
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and 
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, .... " 
593 F. 2d, at 427. 
Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative 
history accords with the natural reading of the statute. 
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of 
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is 
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to 
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the 
contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 
' ~ The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment ac-
tions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at 
---. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to 
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant 
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the 
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limit-
ing Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not 
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
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As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em-
ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its 
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to 
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legisla-
tive history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to con-
gressional intent should a court presume to add what Con-
gress failed to include. And, however else one might 
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court to-
day, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of 
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance .... " § 901(a). 
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support 
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legisla-
tive history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was 
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at 
--. Although the Court examines at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to 
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could 
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether 
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of ex-
pertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; 
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately 
proscribed and provided remedies for the conduct in ques-
tion. When these factors are considered, there is no justifi-
cation for reading sex employment discrimination language 
into § 901. 
tion within Title IX. 
.. 
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If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative 
draftsman would have written § 901 as above set forth. The 
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employ-
ment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. More-
over, although these other statutes had been enacted by an 
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and 
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were 
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination 
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress 
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this 
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language 
ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the 
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies 
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation statute with carefully prescribed procedures for con-
ciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available 
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of re-
lief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimina-
tion and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within 
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to 
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund ter-
mination, apparently now available at the request of any fe-
male employee who can prove discrimination in employment 
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of 
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded 
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. In-
deed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as em-
ployment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employ-
ment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no 
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guid-
ance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. 
•• It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-
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(Title IX) with 42 U.S. C. §2000e et seq. (Title VII). The 
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate 
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was avail-
able under Title VII.'5 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27. 
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX 
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 
contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered 
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely 
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive 
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by differ-
ent departments of government with different enforcement 
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods.'6 The 
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII, 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title 
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are 
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW, 
45 CFR §§80.7-80.10. 
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and 
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single prob-
lem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In con-
trast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment dis-
putes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination 
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
1~ An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district 
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her 
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, re-
quest that funds be terminated under Title IX. 
16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental 
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in em-
ployment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be 
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination 
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate 
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted 
to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two 
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment 
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, 
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
• 
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District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), 
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, 
were established specifically for the purpose of regulat-
ing discrimination in employment practices. These 
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legisla-
tion has provided them with the investigative and en-
forcement machinery necessary to compel compliance 
with regulations against sex discrimination in employ-
ment. HEW does not have similar enforcement author-
ity." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the fed-
eral respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo 
court thought was self evident: 
"The Department of Education has only limited exper-
tise in employment matters. Its view is that employ-
ment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropri-
ate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicotor 
General, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu-
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five per-
ceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) 
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include lan-
guage in§ 901 with respect to discrimination that would have 
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third stat-
ute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for 
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to in-
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event 
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elude in the third statute appropriate procedural and reme-
dial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) 
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in 
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes 
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and en-
force employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title VI, 
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employ-
ment, but did not make that remedy available to those dis-
criminated against on the basis of race. 
Surely Congress has more common sense and expertise 
than the Court would attribute to it . 
To: Tne vme1 .J u:suct:: 
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NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., 
PETITIONERS, v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
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[April -, 1982] 
POWELL, J., dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal 
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund re-
cipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds 
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory lan-
guage, its legislative history, and several post-enactment 
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is nei-
ther consistent with the statutory language nor supported by 
its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
I 
Although the Court begins with the language of the stat-
'As noted by the Court, ante, at -, n. 4, HEW's duties under Title 
IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3) 
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in 
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this 
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at -, n. 4. 
2 The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses 
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at -. 
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ute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the 
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section consider-
ing the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the 
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an in-
terpretation actually at odds with the language used in the 
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "(s]ection 901's broad 
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the 
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as 
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the stat-
utory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972, 
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or 
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiv-
ing federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Con-
gress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, 
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) de-
nied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the 
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimina-
tion under an education program or activity. Moreover, 
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em-
3 I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a fed-
eral program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, 
protected by Title IX. See ante, at -. Respondents Elaine Dove and 
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any 
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher 
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in 
employmenL 
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict lan-
guage in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4 
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of ap-
peals to consider the question before us reached the conclu-
sion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory 
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee 
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other 
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court 
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal 
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving 
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being 
funded by the United States government." The court went 
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific ex-
emptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to stu-
dents, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools 
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the 
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not-
'See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal 
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees .... "). 
• The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes 
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX 
does protect employees." Ante, at- (citation omitted). I am unable 
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the 
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did in-
tend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions 
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe 
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 
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ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so 
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language 
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The 
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of 
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against pro-
gram beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
A 
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX 
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a 
6 The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in I sleslboro. And in 
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom. 
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009 (1980), the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit de-
cisions, noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of 
Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in 
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, 
the court did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated 
that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 
777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 
(1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 
80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regu-
lations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending 
program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted that pro-
gram-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, e. g., if 
they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid with 
federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal 
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, 
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of' or "subject to discrimination 
under'' the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indi-
cation it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory em-
ployment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly em-
ployees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers. 
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "ex-
clude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court 
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to 
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination." Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory 
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee 
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied 
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress 
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, 
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously 
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The 
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far 
short of this standard. 
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by 
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in 
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been 
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not 
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of indi-
viduals to perform work connected with the educational ac-
tivities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), but it did not apply to administrative, 
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 
7 See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402, 
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is 
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29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national 
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and 
activities. 
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed 
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover 
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. 
Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for 
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003 
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, 
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex 
discrimination in such programs. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination. 
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language 
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries 
of federally funded educational programs and activities. 
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it 
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to 
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded pro-
grams, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8 
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3.9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon 
8 The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical. 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX). 
9 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
tion under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to 
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary 
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 
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v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770--711 (1979), 
when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provi-
sion to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had 
been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the 
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it 
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, 
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
710--711 (1979). This point begs the question, however, 
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title 
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment 
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court 
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a 
section, i. e. §604, 42 U. S.C. §2000d-3, expressly stating 
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund bene-
ficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an 
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title 
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the 
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. 
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amend-
ment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the 
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to imple-
ment Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the 
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh 
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equiva-
lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of 
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, 
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, 
; 
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at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that 
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004 
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while ex-
plaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that 
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without refer-
ence to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and 
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a 
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill 
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as 
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the 
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is 
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use 
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a sub-
stantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious 
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX 
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the 
Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single 
10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. 
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman 
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI). 
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senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did 
state that faculty employment would be covered by his 
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX 
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated 
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title 
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he re-
garded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers dis-
crimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 
- (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of 
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and 
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regard-
less of whether. Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an 
" The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the 
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amend-
ment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
" See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at 
--. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment). 
The Court argues against the relevance of the portion of Senator Bayh's 
statement that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing that portion 
as.. "inadvertent". See ante at --, n. 15. This hardly gives one confi-
dence that the Senator's statements, selectively relied upon by the Court, 
are not also inadvertent. Moreover, the Court's decision concededly is 
based solely on discussion on the floor of the Senate. We note-as evi-
dence of how little that discussion actually supports the Court-that the 
views of Courts of Appeals judges with respect to its import have ranged 
from viewing it as indicating no intention to include employment discrimi-
nation in Title IX to recognizing that, like most floor debates, the oral 
statements of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not 
ambiguous. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995 (CA6), 
cert. granted sub nom., United States Department of Education v. Seattle 
University, 449 U. S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 
600 F . 2d 581, 585 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979); Islesboro 
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elipsis rather than include the following words from the sec-
ond Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally as-
sisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amend-
ment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he 
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI 
rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a 
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court 
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title 
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted 
in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the 
discussion immediately preceding and following the 
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh di-
vided his analysis into three sections, two of which were 
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), 
the third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be 
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think 
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly 
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and 
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, .... " 
593 F. 2d, at 427. 
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428 (1979), cert denied, 444 \ 
u. s. 972 (1979). 
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Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative 
history accords with the natural reading of the statute. 
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of 
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is 
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to 
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the 
contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em-
ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its 
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to 
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legisla-
tive history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to con-
gressional intent should a court presume to add what Con-
gress failed to include. And, however else one might 
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court to-
day, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of 
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance .... " § 901(a). 
'
3 The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment ac-
tions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at 
---. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to 
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant 
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the 
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limit-
ing Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not 
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
tion within Title IX. 
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The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support 
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legisla-
tive history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was 
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at 
--. Although the Court examines at length the truncated 
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to 
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could 
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether 
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of ex-
pertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; 
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately 
proscribed and provided remedies for the conduct in ques-
tion. When these factors are considered, there is no justifi-
cation for reading sex employment discrimination language 
into § 901. 
If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative 
draftsman would have written§ 901 as above set forth. The 
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employ-
ment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. More-
over, although these other statutes had been enacted by an 
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and 
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were 
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination 
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress 
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this 
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language 
ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the 
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies 
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation statute with carefully prescribed procedures for con-
ciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available 
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of re-
lief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimina-
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tion and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within 
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. 
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to 
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund ter-
mination, apparently now available at the request of any fe-
male employee who can prove discrimination in employment 
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of 
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded 
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. In-
deed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as em-
ployment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employ-
ment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no 
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guid-
ance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. 
(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The 
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate 
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was avail-
able under Title VII. 15 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27. 
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX 
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 
14 It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII, 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title 
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are 
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW, 
45 CFR §§ 80.7-80.10. 
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S.C and 
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single prob-
lem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In con-
trast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment dis-
putes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination 
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
'"An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district 
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her 
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, re-
quest that funds be terminated under Title IX. 
)/. 
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contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered 
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely 
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive 
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by differ-
ent departments of government with different enforcement 
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The 
District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), 
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, 
were established specifically for the purpose of regulat-
ing discrimination in employment practices. These 
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legisla-
tion has provided them with the investigative and en-
forcement machinery necessary to compel compliance 
with regulations against sex discrimination in employ-
ment. HEW does not have similar enforcement author-
ity." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the fed-
eral respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo 
court thought was self evident: 
16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental 
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in em-
ployment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be 
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination 
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate 
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted 
to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two 
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment 
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, 
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event 
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra, 
at-. 
8~986--DISSENT 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL 15 
"The Department of Education has only limited exper-
tise in employment matters. Its view is that employ-
ment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropri-
ate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu-
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five per-
ceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) 
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include lan-
guage in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have 
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third stat-
ute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for 
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to in-
clude in the third statute appropriate procedural and reme-
dial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) 
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in 
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes 
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and en-
force employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title IX, 
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employ-
ment, but did not make that remedy available to those dis-
criminated against on the basis of race. 
In response to this dissent, see n. 26, ante at 24, the Court 
states that the factors considered in Part III, supra at --
--, summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining 
legislative intent". If this were a "plain language" case, this 
statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the 
Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely 
by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies 
heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on 
the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies 
reason to say that a court should not consider what reason-
able legislators surely would have considered. Where ambi- \ 
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guity exists surely it is not "irrelevant", to the process of as-
certaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically 
other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun 
common sense in resolving ambiguities. 17 
"See, e. g., Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 77 (1976) (when statute is 
ambiguous, Court must "draw upon 'those common-sense assumptions that 
must be made in determining direction without a compass.'") (citation 
ommitted); Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 595 (1934) (the in-
terpretation that a reasonable Congress would have intended is adopted by 
the Court); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 456.12, at 
38 (4th ed. 1973) (legislative bodies presumed to act reasonably). See also 
Kokoszkav. Beljo1·d, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a stat-
ute, the Court will look not merely to a particular clause in which general 
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or 
statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the 
Jaw, ... .'"). 
___ __,_ ___ _ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-986 
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. , 
PETITIONERS, v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal 
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund re-
cipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds 
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory lan-
guage, its legislative history, and several post-enactment 
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is nei-
ther consistent with the statutory language nor supported by 
its legislative history, I dissent. 2 
1 As noted by the Court, ante, at -, n. 4, HEW's duties under Title 
IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3) 
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat. 
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in 
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this 
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at -, n. 4. 
2 The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses 
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at - . 
\ 
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I 
Although the Court begins with the language of the stat-
ute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the 
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section consider-
ing the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the 
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an in-
terpretation actually at odds with the language used in the 
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's broad 
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the 
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as 
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the stat-
utory language provides. 
In relevant part, the statute states: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972, 
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). 
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's 
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or 
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiv-
ing federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Con-
gress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, 
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) de-
nied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the 
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimina-
3 I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a fed-
eral program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, 
protected by Title IX. See ante, at-. Respondents Elaine Dove and 
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any 
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher 
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in 
employment. 
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tion under an education program or activity. Moreover, 
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em-
ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict lan-
guage in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4 
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of ap-
peals to consider the question before us reached the conclu-
sion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory 
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee 
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other 
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court 
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal 
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving 
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being 
funded by the United States government." The court went 
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the 
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific ex-
emptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to stu-
dents, not employees. 5 Ibid. 
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools 
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), 
'See, e. g., 42 U.S. C. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal 
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees .... "). 
' The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes 
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of 
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX 
does protect" employees. Ante, at -- (citation omitted). I am unable 
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions 
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the 
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did in-
tend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions 
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe 
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 
~98&-DISSENT 
4 NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the 
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not-
ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so 
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language 
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The 
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of 
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against pro-
gram beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. 
II 
A 
6 The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. 
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in I sleslboro. And in 
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom. 
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009 (1980), the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit de-
cisions, noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of 
Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in 
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, 
the court did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated 
that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 
777. 
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 
(1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 
~1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regu-
lations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending 
program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted that pro-
gram-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, e. g., if 
they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid with 
federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal 
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, 
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of' or "subject to discrimination 
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indi-
cation it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports 
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory em-
ployment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly em-
ployees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers. 
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The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX 
"does not expressly include . . . employees." But it finds a 
strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "ex-
clude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court 
then turns to the legislative history for evidence as to 
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment 
discrimination. Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of 
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory 
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee 
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied 
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress 
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, 
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously 
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The 
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far 
short of this standard. 
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by 
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in 
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been 
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. 
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not 
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of indi-
viduals to perform work connected with the educational ac-
tivities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
7 See, e. g. , Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402, 
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is 
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the 
legislative intent."). 
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banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative, 
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national 
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and 
activities. 
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed 
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover 
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. 
Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for 
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003 
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, 
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex 
discrimination in such programs. 
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination. 
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language 
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries 
of federally funded educational programs and activities. 
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it 
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to 
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded pro-
grams, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8 
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3.9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979), 
8 The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical. 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX). 
9 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
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when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provi-
sion to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had 
been its model. 
B 
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the 
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it 
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, 
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however, 
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title 
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment 
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court 
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a 
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating 
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund bene-
ficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an 
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, 
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, 
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title 
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the 
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. 
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amend-
ment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the 
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, 
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to imple-
ment Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). 
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the 
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh 
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equiva-
tion under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to 
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary 
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of 
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, 
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, 
at --. A strong argument, however, can be made that 
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004 
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Repre-
sentative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while ex-
plaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that 
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as 
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without refer-
ence to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is 
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and 
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a 
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill 
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as 
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the 
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is 
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use 
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a sub-
stantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious 
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
c 
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX 
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the 
10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. 
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman 
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI). 
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Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single 
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at -- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did 
state that faculty employment would be covered by his 
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX 
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated 
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title 
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to 
redress discrimination in employment. 
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he re-
garded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers dis-
crimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 
- (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of 
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and 
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regard-
less of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an 
11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the 
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amend-
ment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant 
House and Senate Committees. 
12 See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at 
--. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment). 
The Court argues against the relevance of the portion of Senator Bayh's 
statement that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing that portion 
as "inadvertent". See ante at-, n. 15. This hardly gives one confi-
dence that the Senator's statements, selectively relied upon by the Court, 
are not also inadvertent. Moreover, the Court's decision concededly is 
based solely on discussion on the floor of the Senate. We note-as evi-
dence of how little that discussion actually supports the Court-that the 
views of Courts of Appeals judges with respect to its import have ranged 
from viewing it as indicating no intention to include employment discrimi-
nation in Title IX to recognizing that, like most floor debates, the oral 
statements of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not 
ambiguous. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995 (CA6), 
cert. granted sub nom., United States Department of Education v. Seattle 
University, 449 U. S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 
600 F. 2d 581, 585 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979); Islesboro 
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elipsis rather than include the following words from the sec-
ond Bayh statement: 
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally as-
sisted programs and activities is already prohibited by 
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately 
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amend-
ment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions 
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --). 
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he 
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI 
rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. 
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at-- (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a 
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court 
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title 
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted 
in Islesboro: 
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the 
discussion immediately preceding and following the 
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh di-
vided his analysis into three sections, two of which were 
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), 
the third at employees (employment). While Senator 
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be 
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think 
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly 
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and 
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . . " 
593 F. 2d, at 427. 
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428 (1979), cert denied, 444 
u. s. 972 (1979). 
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Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative 
history accords with the natural reading of the statute. 
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of 
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment 
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is 
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to 
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the 
contrary, they are ambiguous.'3 
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em-
ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its 
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to 
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legisla-
tive history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to con-
gressional intent should a court presume to add what Con-
gress failed to include. And, however else one might 
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court to-
day, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. 
III 
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of 
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance .... " § 901(a). 
18 The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment ac-
tions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at 
---. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to 
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant 
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the 
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limit-
ing Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not 
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
tion within Title IX. 
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The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support 
for its position in this language, it must look to the legislative 
history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was meant to 
prohibit employment discrimination. Ante, at --. Al-
though the Court examines at length the truncated legisla-
tive history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to con-
gressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have 
been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Con-
gress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise 
in legislating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii) 
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately pro-
scribed and provided remedies for the conduct in question. 
When these factors are considered, there is no justification 
for reading sex employment discrimination language into 
§901. 
If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative 
draftsman would have written § 901 as above set forth. The 
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employ-
ment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. More-
over, although these other statutes had been enacted by an 
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and 
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were 
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination 
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress 
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this 
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language 
ambiguous at best. 
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and 
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the 
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies 
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation statute with carefully prescribed procedures for con-
ciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available 
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of re-
lief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimina-
'• 
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tion and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within 
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to 
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund ter-
mination, apparently now available at the request of any fe-
male employee who can prove discrimination in employment 
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of 
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded 
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. In-
deed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as em-
ployment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employ-
ment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no 
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guid-
ance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. 
(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The 
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate 
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was avail-
able under Title Vll.'5 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27. 
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX 
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 
" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII, 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title 
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are 
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW, 
45 CFR §§ 80.7--80.10. 
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and 
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single prob-
lem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act 
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9--80.11. In con-
trast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment dis-
putes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination 
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
16 An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district 
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her 
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, re-




14 NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL 
contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered 
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely 
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive 
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by differ-
ent departments of government with different enforcement 
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The 
District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), 
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed: 
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, 
were established specifically for the purpose of regulat-
ing discrimination in employment practices. These 
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legisla-
tion has provided them with the investigative and en-
forcement machinery necessary to compel compliance 
with regulations against sex discrimination in employ-
ment. HEW does not have similar enforcement author-
ity." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. 
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the fed-
eral respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo 
court thought was self evident: 
16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental 
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in em-
ployment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be 
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination 
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate 
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted 
to employment discrimination. 
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two 
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment 
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, 
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given 
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event 
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra, 
at--. 
t· • • 
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"The Department of Education has only limited exper-
tise in employment matters. Its view is that employ-
ment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropri-
ate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, p. 37. 
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu-
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five per-
ceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) 
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include lan-
guage in§ 901 with respect to discrimination that would have 
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third stat-
ute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for 
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to in-
clude in the third statute appropriate procedural and reme-
dial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) 
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in 
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes 
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and en-
force employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title IX, 
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employ-
ment, but did not make that remedy available to those dis-
criminated against on the basis of race. 
In response to this dissent, see n. 26, ante at 24, the Court 
states that the factors considered in Part III, supra at --
--, summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining 
legislative intent". If this were a "plain language" case, this 
statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the 
Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely 
by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies 
heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on 
the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies 
reason to say that a court should not consider what reason-
able legislators surely would have considered. Where ambi-
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guity exists surely it is not "irrelevant," to the process of as-
certaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically 
other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun 
common sense in resolving ambiguities. 17 
17 See, e. g., Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (when statute is 
ambiguous, Court must "draw upon 'those common-sense assumptions that 
must be made in determining direction without a compass.'") (citation 
ommitted); Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 595 (1934) (the in-
terpretation that a reasonable Congress would have intended is adopted 
by the Court); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 456.12, 
at 38 (4th ed. 1973) (legislative bodies presumed to act reasonably). See 
also Kokoszkav. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a 
statute, the Court will look not merely to a particular clause in which gen-
eral words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole stat-
ute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, . 
. . . '"). 
